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THE UNEASY CASE FOR TRANSJURISDICTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
 
Jonathan Remy Nash† 
 
Federal courts often decide cases that include matters of state law, while state 
courts often decide cases that raise matters of federal law. Most of these cases are 
decided within the court system in which they originate. Recent commentary advocates 
more transjurisdictional adjudication through the expanded use of existing procedural 
devices, and development of new devices. Some commentators endorse greater use of 
certification by federal courts, while others advocate greater use of transjurisdictional 
procedural devices to increase the availability of a federal forum to resolve federal legal 
issues. In this Article, I call for refinement of this approach and argue that 
commentators have overlooked several looming obstacles. First, the ability of state 
courts to resolve issues of state law and federal courts issues of federal law relies upon 
the erroneous assumption that issues of federal and state law are readily separable. 
Second, the use of transjurisdictional procedural devices that send back to state court 
state law issues that federal courts otherwise would decide run the risk of admitting state 
court bias, or the appearance of bias, against out-of-state litigants. Third, commentators 
underestimate the extent to which transjurisdictional adjudication relies upon 
cooperation between court systems. Identifying these obstacles leads to a fuller 
recognition of the costs and benefits of transjurisdictional adjudication, which in turn is 
useful as a metric against which to measure existing and proposed transjurisdictional 
procedural devices and as an aid in refining existing devices. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
† Visiting Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, 2007-2008; Robert C. Cudd 
Professor of Environmental Law, Tulane Law School; Professor of Law, Emory University School of 
Law, effective Fall 2008. I benefited greatly from presentations at the annual meeting of the Law and 
Society Association, at the May Gathering for Junior Law Faculty at Georgetown University Law Center, 
at the annual meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, and at a faculty workshop at 
Tulane Law School.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal courts are often called upon to decide cases that include matters of state 
law, while state courts often are called upon to decide cases that raise matters of both 
federal and state law. The vast bulk of these cases are decided within the court system in 
which the cases originate, without the benefit of input from the other court system as to 
how to resolve the legal issues that arise under the other legal system. In these cases of 
“intersystemic adjudication,”1 the court system that decides the case will try to resolve 
“foreign” legal questions in the way that the other court system would. The court system 
will consider cases issued by the other court system that have addressed the issue in 
question.  
Recent commentary by academics and judges suggests that the best way to 
resolve these cases is to have the court system definitively resolve those issues that arise 
under that court system’s “native” law. These commentators advocate expanded use of 
existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, and development and use of new devices. 
For example, Professor Bradford Clark argues for greater use of certification by federal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2005) (defining “intersystemic adjudication” as “the interpretation by a court operating 
within one political system of laws of another political system,” and describing the phenomenon as 
“pervasive”).  
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courts to allow state courts to resolve state law issues,2 while Professor Barry Friedman 
advocates greater use of what I shall refer to as “transjurisdictional procedural devices”3 
and in particular for greater availability of a federal forum to resolve federal law issues.4  
In this Article, I call for refinement of this approach. I argue that the 
commentators have overlooked several looming obstacles. 
First, the ability of state courts to resolve issues of state law and federal courts 
issues of federal law presupposes that the issues of federal and state law are readily 
separable. This presupposition masks several difficulties. First, at least in cases that raise 
intertwining issues of federal and state law, the federal and state law issues must be 
disentangled. But how is this to be done? Who is to do it? What if the federal and state 
courts disagree as to the proper disaggregation of the case? And, once the case is 
decomposed, should the court that is called upon, purportedly, to respond to particular 
issues of law simply address those legal issues, or ought it to opine upon the proper 
ultimate resolution of the entire case?  
Second, the desirability of having state courts resolve state law matters assumes, 
if implicitly, that state courts will get questions of state law “correct”—or at least that 
they will be more likely to get them “correct” than federal courts. In fact, however, as the 
constitutional inclusion and the continued congressional authorization of federal diversity 
jurisdiction suggest, it may well be that state courts’ susceptibility to bias against out-of-
staters might render them less able than federal courts to resolve state law questions 
“correctly.”  
Third, commentators underestimate the extent to which the successful use of 
transjurisdictional procedural devices relies upon cooperation between court systems, and 
overestimate the extent to which courts in different systems have incentives to, and in 
fact will, cooperate.   
These obstacles are not simply important in the abstract. First, these obstacles 
have manifested themselves in practice. Second, the discussion of the obstacles leads to a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 See infra text accompanying notes 32-40.  
3 I use the terminology “transjurisdictional procedural device” to refer to a procedural device that 
involves the judiciary of more than one judicial system. I choose the term so as clearly to distinguish 
Professor Schapiro’s use of “intersystemic adjudication,” which he means to refer to courts in a single 
judicial system interpreting the law of another judicial system. See supra note 1. 
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fuller recognition of the costs of transjurisdictional adjudication, and of the potential 
benefits of intersystemic adjudication. I identify three categories of costs and benefits that 
should be, but as a general matter have not been, fully incorporated into benefit-cost 
evaluations.  
First, the obstacles themselves translate into costs in the implementation of 
transjurisdictional procedural devices. They may act to make particular applications of a 
device costly, and in the long run to sour courts on particular devices and to discourage 
their use.  
Second, commentators often tend to extol the virtue of affording court systems the 
opportunity to resolve questions arising under the system’s native law. While this is 
clearly a benefit offered by the use of transjurisdictional adjudication, commentators have 
sometimes tended to elevate this benefit to the exclusion of other benefits. In reality, our 
federal system also reflects other values, as I now discuss. 
Third, so attracted have commentators been to the apparent benefits of 
transjurisdictional procedural devices that they have tended to downplay the benefits of 
intersystemic adjudication. But intersystemic adjudication offers numerous benefits, 
including dialogue among court systems, and the opportunity for multiple courts to try to 
interpret the law “correctly.”  
This fuller understanding of costs and benefits is useful as a metric against which 
to measure existing and proposed transjurisdictional procedural devices. It is also useful 
as an aid in refining existing devices. As an illustration, I describe how one might refine 
the current procedure by which federal courts certify questions of law to state high courts.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I provide an overview of court 
systems’ authority to decide issues of law arising under their own “native” law. I also 
discuss how courts usually decide such issues without input from the other judicial 
system, but also discuss methods that allow for a court in the other system directly to 
resolve those questions native to that court system.  
In Part III, I describe various commentators’ proposals for new, and expanded use 
of existing, transjurisdictional procedural devices. In Part IV, I discuss obstacles to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 See infra text accompanying notes 44-52.  
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implementation of these proposals that the commentators have either overlooked or 
undervalued.  
In Part V, I build upon the discussion in the previous Parts to suggest a fuller 
understanding of the costs and benefits of transjurisdictional procedural devices. I use 
that understanding to evaluate commentators’ proposals, and then as a guide in refining 
existing certification procedure.  
 
II. RESOLVING ISSUES ARISING UNDER ANOTHER SYSTEM’S LAW 
 
State courts are often called upon to decide matters of federal law,5 and federal 
courts are often called upon to decide matters of state law.6 Both state and federal courts 
also may be called upon to decide cases in which state law causes of action implicate 
issues of, or are intertwined with, federal law,7 or federal law causes of action that 
implicate issues of state law.8  
There are a few procedural devices that afford opportunities for transjurisdictional 
dialogue and adjudication. First, the Supreme Court has the power to review, by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990). For a discussion of early state 
court practices interpreting federal statutes, see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1529-48 (2006).  
While settings in which courts of one state endeavor to discern the law of a sister state raise questions 
analogous to those I address here, they lie beyond the scope of this Article.  
6 See generally Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study 
in Interactive Redish, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 898-99 (1985).  
First, the federal diversity jurisdiction authorizes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d) (2006)—indeed, 
demands, see Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943)—that federal courts hear some cases in 
which issues of state law alone arise.  
Second, federal courts often hear state law causes of action that are supplemental to causes of action that 
arise under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).  
Third, it is possible that federal and state law issues are intertwined: state law might incorporate or 
implicate federal law, see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 309 
(2005), or federal law might incorporate or implicate state law, see, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508-09 (2001) (holding that “federal common law governs the claim-
preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal court sitting in diversity,” and that the common law rule 
incorporates state law); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006) (incorporating state criminal law into federal criminal law on 
federal enclaves located within the state).  
7 For example, states often interpret state constitutional provisions to incorporate the legal standards of 
their federal analogs. For discussion of the difficulties faced by federal courts when they are called upon to 
interpret such state constitutional provisions, see Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State 
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999).  
8 For example, the Court has held that the question of whether the Takings Clause applies to a property 
interest is not resolved by reference to the Takings Clause, but rather by reference to some independent 
source of law, such as state law. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).  
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discretionary grant of certiorari, state courts’ determination of federal law.9 In a case in 
which some issues arise under state law and others under federal law, the Supreme Court 
will consider only those issues that arise under federal law (or, to the extent that the grant 
of certiorari is narrower, some subset thereof).10  
In order for the Court to review the case, the losing party must petition for a writ 
of certiorari, and then the Court must accept that petition and determine the scope of 
review.11 The state court has no discretion to request Supreme Court review,12 nor to 
deny review if the Court chooses to review the case. Further, remedies are available to 
the Court to address a state court’s failure to abide by the Court’s mandate.13 
Two transjurisdictional procedural devices offer federal courts the opportunity to 
obtain direct feedback from the state court system as to the resolution of state law issues: 
abstention and certification. Under abstention, the federal court abstains from proceeding 
forward with the case in federal court to allow a pending state court case that will resolve 
the state law issues in the federal court case, or to allow the parties to file such an action 
in state court. If the parties ask the federal court to retain jurisdiction over any remaining 
federal issues (and probably even if they object to the state court’s attempt to resolve 
federal issues), the state court’s jurisdiction will be limited to resolving the state law 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).  
10 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1408 (“In exercising its appellate authority over state courts, . . . 
the U.S. Supreme Court does not generally review questions of state law.”).  
In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), the Court indicated that Congress 
cannot constitutionally confer upon the Supreme Court the power to review state court resolutions of state 
law. The constitutional basis for this holding, however, is somewhat dubious. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, 
Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 920 (1986). For arguments in 
favor of broader Supreme Court authority to review state courts’ determinations of state law, see Henry 
Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1919 (2003); John Harrison, Federal Appellate Jurisdiction Over Questions of State Law in State Courts, 7 
GREEN BAG 2D 353 (2004). .  
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006). For a discussion of the evolution over time of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to review state court decisions from mandatory to discretionary, and of the change in the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction away from the restriction that it could only review denials of federal rights, 
see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 466-68 (5th ed. 2003).  
12 Like any lower court, a state high court may attempt to “signal” the Supreme Court that the case is 
worthy of review. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial 
Dissent and Discretionary Review (unpublished manuscript, available on SSRN).  
13 See generally FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 481-83. On the topic of state court evasion of 
Supreme Court mandates, see, for example, Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded 
to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1954); Note, Supreme Court Evasion of United States 
Supreme Court Mandates, 56 YALE L.J. 574 (1947).  
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issues.14 The most commonly used form of abstention, Pullman abstention,15 is available 
only in cases where resolution of the state law questions might relieve the court of the 
need to confront unclear issues of federal constitutional law.16 While there are other forms 
of abstention that can apply in pure diversity cases, these abstention devices are quite 
limited in scope.17 
Certification is a procedural device that achieves the same result as abstention.18 It 
is available in cases in which Pullman abstention can be invoked and—since, unlike 
Pullman abstention, certification is not unavailable in pure diversity cases—certification 
is available in more cases than Pullman abstention. Certification is also more streamlined 
than Pullman abstention.  
Either or both parties to a pending federal court lawsuit may request that the 
federal court initiate certification proceedings, or the federal court may do so sua 
sponte.19 If certification is to be used, then the federal court identifies the issues of state 
law that it wishes the state high court to resolve and certifies those questions to the state 
court.20 The state high court has discretion to accept or reject the certification request.21 
In particular, state courts will tend to deny certification requests where the factual record 
is insufficiently developed; this is in order to minimize the possibility that the state 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-19 (1964) (discussing right of party 
to federal court case where court has abstained pending resolution of state court case to reserve issues of 
federal law for resolution in federal court). 
15 Pullman abstention is named for the case that first recognized the doctrine, Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
16 See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (holding that Pullman abstention is unavailable 
in cases where no federal law issue is present). The applicability of Pullman abstention in cases where the 
resolution of state law issues would obviate the need to decide an unclear subconstitutional federal law 
issue. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1683 n.33 (2003) (discussing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949)).  
17 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial 
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1517-24 (1997) (discussing Erie-based abstention, 
including Burford and Thibodaux abstention).  
18 In one way the result achieved under certification is even greater: Under certification it is guaranteed 
that the state high court will resolve the state law issue definitively (assuming that court agrees to answer 
the certified questions). By contrast, because state high courts generally retain the discretion to deny review 
of lower state court rulings, a state high court might never hear the case under abstention, with the lower 
state courts effectively providing resolution.  
19 See generally Nash, supra note 16, at 1690, 1692. 
20 See id. at 1692-93. 
21 See id. at 1693. 
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court’s answers will prove, once the record is developed, to be mere advisory opinions.22 
The state court also is free to rephrase the certified questions if it believes another 
phrasing would be more appropriate.23 Once the state court answers the certified 
questions, the federal court resolves the case with the benefit of those answers.24  
Certiorari review, abstention, and certification thus provide opportunities for 
transjurisdictional adjudication.25 These devices are limited, however, in terms of both 
scope and current use. Typically, then, state courts must resolve federal law issues 
without help from the federal judiciary,26 and federal courts must resolve state law issues 
on their own.27 Judicial and legislative action may change this, however. The Supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 See id. at 1694 & n.82.  
23 See id. at 1694 n.80. The parties to the federal court case are generally allowed to file briefs with, and 
argue before, the state high court. See id. at 1694 & n.81. 
24 See id. at 1695-96. 
25 These devices are among the few situations in which direct federal-state transjurisdictional dialogue 
and interaction are possible. See, e.g., Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 903 
(1st Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“The certification process is the only opportunity for direct dialogue between a 
federal and a state court.”). Cf. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing 
Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 205 (1995) (“Federal and 
state judges in charge of ‘All Brooklyn Navy Yard’ asbestos cases literally sat in the same room, jointly 
convening a ‘state and federal court’ and ruling together on issues.”). Although one might also include 
habeas cases in this mix, habeas cases are in the nature of collateral review rather than direct dialogue.  
Removal of cases to federal court is more complicated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). Removal of 
federal question cases allows federal courts to resolve issues arising under federal law. The removal will 
generally apply to the entire case, however, so that state courts will lose the ability to resolve issues of state 
law to the extent the case raises such issues. But cf. id. § 1441(c) (allowing for removal of “the entire case” 
“[w]henever a separate and independent [federal question] claim or cause of action . . . is joined with one or 
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action,” but also empowering federal court to remand 
“all matters in which State law predominates”). Moreover, the removal of cases grounded in diversity is 
designed to deny state courts the power to resolve questions of state law. Other removal statutes also open 
the doors of federal jurisdiction to claims arising purely under state law. See, e.g., id. §§ 1441(d) (allowing 
for removal of “[a]ny civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state”), 1442(a) (allowing for 
removal of “[a] civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court” against the United States, 
an agency thereof, and certain federal officers and officials). 
26 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 825 (2005); Bellia, supra note 5. State courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent on federal law, 
and also by any decisions on federal law by a higher-ranked state court whose decisions would ordinarily 
be binding upon the state court. The state court also might look to lower federal courts’ interpretations of 
state law and interpretations of courts of other states, both of which might be persuasive. See State v. 
Knowles, 371 A.2d 624, 627-28 (Me. 1977) (“[E]ven though only a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States is the supreme law of the land on a federal constitutional issue, nevertheless ‘in the interest of 
developing harmonious federal-state relationships it is a wise policy that a state court of last resort accept, 
so far as reasonably possible, a decision’” of the federal court of appeals within the geographic circuit of 
which the state lies on a federal constitutional question. (quoting State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 667 (Me. 
1973) (Wernick, J., concurring))). 
27 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1421 (“State courts cannot review a federal court’s interpretation 
of state law.”).  
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Court has suggested that federal courts make greater use of certification,28 and recent 
legislation that will allow more cases that raise state law claims to be heard in federal 
courts29 likely will increase the occasions on which federal courts will seek to certify 
questions of state law. Greateruse of certification may also result from the Court’s recent 
reaffirmance, in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing,30 that federal question jurisdiction extends beyond cases in which a claim 
formally arises under federal law and reaches state law claims that incorporate some 
aspect of federal law.31 Many legal commentators would applaud such changes, as I 
explain in the next Part.  
 
III. PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED USE OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURAL 
DEVICES 
 
Most state courts resolve federal law questions without the benefit of Supreme 
Court enlightenment and, analogously, federal courts resolve state law questions without 
the benefit of abstention or certification. Recent commentary has disparaged this 
approach. Whether by expanding the use of certification and parties’ ability to reserve 
issues for review by a court in a particular system, or by fundamentally altering and 
intermixing the plumbing of the state and federal judicial systems, commentators 
advocate the increased use of and reliance upon, and the development of new, 
transjurisdictional procedural devices. In this Part, I briefly survey some of these 
suggestions. In the next Part, I suggest obstacles that these commentators have 
overlooked or underestimated.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
The Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938), mandates that federal 
courts decide state law issues in accordance with the laws of the state, as set out by the state legislature and 
judicial system.  
28 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 (1997); Barry Friedman, Under the 
Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1211, 1254 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has indicated it expects wider use of certification procedures.”).  
29 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (Feb. 18, 2005) 
(amending the federal judicial code to allow jurisdiction in federal court over certain class actions based 
upon minimal diversity; codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)).  
30 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
31 For discussion, see, for example, Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of State and Federal Power: State 
Judges, Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle”, 81 TUL. L. REV. 283, 290-308 (2006); Richard D. 
Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. 
L.J. 309, 333-36 (2007).  
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Citing inherent problems in all possible approaches to federal courts’ endeavors to 
fulfill their obligation under Erie to estimate state law,32 Professor Bradford Clark 
advocates implementing a presumption in favor of having federal courts certify questions 
of state law to the appropriate state high courts.33 He suggests two methods by which 
federal courts might attempt to divine state law and finds all of them wanting. Under the 
“static approach,” the federal court should “adjudicate the rights and duties of the parties 
without regard to novel rules proposed by the parties, but not yet recognized 
authoritatively by an appropriate organ of the state.”34 Professor Clark finds the static 
approach problematic in that it “may lead federal courts to continue to apply existing 
rules of decision even after state courts are prepared to abandon them,”35 and thus allow 
for the “perpetuat[uation of] outmoded principles of state law by simultaneously drawing 
cases into federal court and depriving state courts of opportunities to adopt novel rules of 
state law.”36 By contrast, under what Professor Clark refers to as the “predictive 
approach,” the federal court "attempts to forecast the development of state law by asking 
what rule of decision the state's highest court is likely to adopt in the future.”37 According 
to Professor Clark, “a federal court’s ‘prediction’ of state law frequently devolves into 
little more than a choice among competing policy considerations.”38 In light of these 
deficiencies with the static and predictive approaches, Professor Clark endorses expanded 
use of certification39 through, in particular, the implementation of “a presumption 
favoring certification of unsettled questions of state law.”40 
Judge Guido Calabresi, too, calls for expanded use of certification, imploring 
federal judges to “certify, certify, certify.”41 “In other words,” he explains, “I believe that 
whenever there is a question of state law that is even possibly in doubt, the federal courts 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32 See Clark, supra note 17, at 1495-1517, 1535-44. 
33 See id. at 1556-63.  
34 Id. at 1537.  
35 Id. at 1541.  
36 Id. at 1541-42.  
37 Id. at 1497. Professor Clark elucidates that federal courts might rely on the predictive approach to 
predict novel state law causes of action, see id. at 1502-08, predict novel state law defenses, see id. at 1508-
13, and predict that existing state law precedent will be overruled, see id. at 1514-16.  
38 Id. See generally id. at 1498-1501.  
39 See id. at 1543-44.  
40 Id. at 1556. See generally id. at 1556-63.  
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should send the question to the highest court of the state, and let the highest court of the 
state decide the issue as it wishes.”42 But Judge Calabresi endorses certification in a form 
slightly different from its current appearance: He believes that, as a prerequisite to 
certification, the federal court should write an opinion resolving the relevant state law 
issue as it believes it should be resolved. The state high court then can treat the federal 
court opinion as it would an opinion of a lower state court on the issue: It can choose to 
grant the request for certification and address the question itself, or it can choose to deny 
the certification request and let the federal court opinion stand (with the state high court 
denial of certification presumably having whatever preclusive effect a discretionary 
denial of review ordinarily has under state law).43  
In a similar vein, Professor Barry Friedman assails what he calls “either-or” 
thinking—that is, that a court (and the associated judicial system) must resolve the 
entirety of all cases before it.44 He explains that to require federal courts to resolve state 
law issues devalues state court interest in resolving those issues, and vice versa.45 
Professor Friedman endorses increased use of certification.46 In addition, he advocates 
expanded use of England reservation doctrine.47 In particular, he describes an 
“anticipatory” England reservation doctrine, under which parties in a state action could 
reserve federal issues when a case could be brought in federal court, even if in fact there 
is no pending federal court case.48 He explains that “[f]ederal jurisdiction should be 
available for federal claims.”49 Thus, “[s]o long as the state party indicates at the outset 
                                                                                                                                                                             
41 Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 
1301 (2003).  
42 Id. (footnote omitted). Judge Alex Kozinski, by contrast, recommends restricting the use of 
certification to a far narrower setting. He argues: “[T]hat a case raises difficult legal questions is not 
enough. . . . Certification is justified only when the state supreme court has provided no authoritative 
guidance, other courts are in serious disarray and the question cries out for a definitive ruling.” Kremen v. 
Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
43 See Calabresi, supra note 41, at 1301-02.  
44 See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1216.  
45 See id. at 1216-26.  
46 See generally id. at 1255-56. Professor Friedman explains that “[c]ertification creates some additional 
delay and expense, but not a great deal, especially considering the benefits of obtaining an authoritative 
ruling.” Id. He appears not to go so far as Professor Clark’s presumption in favor of certification. See id. at 
1276 (“[M]ost diversity cases do not require certification; their disposition rests on state law that is 
sufficiently settled.”). 
47 See id. at 1269-74. 
48 Id. at 1271.  
49 Id. at 1269.  
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that it intends to obtain litigation of federal questions in federal court, that reservation 
should be enough.”50 While recognizing that the increased use of transjurisdictional 
procedural devices will impose some costs on the judicial system and litigants,51 
Professor Friedman concludes that the benefits outweigh those costs.52  
Judge Jon Newman has gone a step farther. Among a series of procedural reforms 
designed to address what he identifies as an overburdened federal judiciary53 is the 
suggestion that, as a matter of discretion, state law issues that arise in federal trial courts 
could be appealed to state intermediate—and then high—courts, and that federal law 
issues that arise in state trial courts could be appealed to federal courts of appeals and 
then the United States Supreme Court.54 Judge Newman would vest discretion to 
administer the system in federal appellate judges; that is, federal circuit judges would 
decide both whether to allow appeals from state trial courts to federal courts of appeals, 
and also would have an effective ‘right of refusal’ as to appeals from federal trial 
courts.55 He also explains that such “[a] discretionary system of reciprocal routing of 
appeals need not be limited to entire cases, but should permit review of single issues as 
well.”56 Thus, for example, “[d]iscretionary access to federal appellate courts might well 
be limited to the federal issues in the state court litigation.”57 
                                                                                                                                                                             
50 Id.  
51 Professor Friedman assesses the costs by considering the number of cases implicated, see id. at 1276-
77, the need for more judges to get up to speed on cases and issues, see id. at 1277, litigation redundancy, 
see id. at 1277-78, and litigant preference, see id. at 1278-79. Below I identify costs that commentators, 
including Professor Friedman, seem to have overlooked or at least undervalued. See infra Part V.A.  
52 See id. at 1279.  
53 See Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial 
System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1989) (lamenting the increase in federal court caseload, and 
arguing that the increase has deleterious effects on the quality of federal judges, the quality of federal 
judges’ performance, and on the functioning of federal courts).  
54 See id. at 774-76.  
55 Judge Newman explicates: 
Administering a system of reciprocal routing of appeals should be a task for federal appellate 
judges. For federal law claims, they should have the discretion to permit federal court appeals 
from cases relegated to state courts. As with the decision to grant access to the federal trial court, 
the appellate access decision would be accomplished without factfinding and would be 
nonreviewable. For state law claims, if it is not acceptable to route all diversity appeals to state 
courts, then federal appellate judges would at least have discretion to deny an opportunity for 
federal court appeal in selected diversity cases and leave them for review within the pertinent 
state appellate system. 
Id. at 775. 
56 Id.; see id. at 775-76.  
57 Id. at 775.  
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Taken as a group, these commentators endorse increased availability of federal 
judicial fora to resolve questions of federal law, and of state judicial fora to resolve 
questions of state law. The trend in commentary—by both legal academics and judges—
is to “resolve” the problem of having one judicial system guess at the proper resolution of 
a question of law arising under the law native to the other judicial system by increasing 
reliance upon, and developing new, transjurisdictional devices. In the next Part, I 
highlight problems that these commentators have either underestimated or overlooked 
entirely.  
 
IV. OBSTACLES TO EXPANDED USE OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL PROCEDURAL 
DEVICES 
 
In the previous Part, I described a trend among commentators that supports both 
the increased use of existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, and an expansion of 
the pantheon of available transjurisdictional devices. The commentators, however, either 
overlook or underestimate the problems associated with the design and use of these 
devices will encounter. In this Part, I elucidate these problems. 
First, transjurisdictional procedural devices raise important, yet underappreciated, 
problems with respect to decomposition of cases into constituent issues. Second, state 
courts may not manipulate state law when at least one of the parties hails from out-of-
state. Third, commentators overlook the importance of whether the effectiveness of 
transjurisdictional devices is—and should be—based upon voluntary cooperation and 
comity, as opposed to disparities in power. I address each of these problems in turn.  
 
A. Decomposition of Cases 
 
Commentators who advocate the introduction of new transjurisdictional devices 
and the expanded use of new and existing transjurisdictional devices tend to assume that 
the decomposition of cases into constituent state and federal issues is readily achievable. 
Indeed, most commentators simply gloss over this step. In reality, however, in the hardly 
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atypical case in which issues of state and federal law intertwine,58 the step is substantial, 
complicated, and potentially controversial.59 Consider the several questions that the 
decomposition of cases implicitly raises. 
The first question is who is to perform the decomposition (or at least to decide 
upon the proper decomposition). The federal court? The state court? The court that 
originally enjoys jurisdiction? The court whose help is sought?60  
The question also arises (and is obviously influenced by the answer to the first 
question) as to how the case is to be decomposed. The decomposition of cases into 
constituent issues can be complicated and raise challenges even in cases that arise under 
the law of a single sovereign.61 The complications and challenges are even greater in the 
context of cases that raise questions of state and federal law that intertwine.62  
Third, once the case is decomposed, and constituent issues are sent by one court 
system to another, should the court system to which constituent issues are sent simply 
resolve those issues—i.e., respond to the particular questions of law that are raised—or 
should it speak to what it believes would be the proper resolution of the underlying case 
(or both)? And, along similar lines, once the court that sent the constituent issues to the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
58 E.g., Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention 
Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1084 (1974) (noting that “the two legal systems are often intertwined in 
a particular case”). 
59 See Redish, supra note 6, at 899 (“[B]ecause of the long tradition of interactive federalism, state and 
federal law cannot always be so easily separated.”).  
60 Note that the answer to these questions well may implicate the concerns of comity, and of power 
disparity, that I discuss below. See infra Part IV.C.  
61 First, consider the degree to which attorneys attempt to “frame” the issues that a case presents to a 
court. Indeed, because the choice of issues allows for the manipulation of the result, efforts to decompose 
cases into issues can fall prey to strategy. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A 
SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 111-24 (2000); Maxwell L. Stearns, 
How Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and 
Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1996).  
Second, on rare occasions, tallying judges’ votes on an issue-by-issue basis, as opposed to an outcome 
basis, may, paradoxically, yield different results. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive 
Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75 (2003) (discussing cases of 
doctrinal paradox).  
It is interesting to note that, much as the availability of interlocutory appeals functions as a natural issue 
decomposition device, see id. at 84-85, so too do cases that traverse the divide between the federal and state 
judicial systems offer an example of “natural” issue decomposition.  
62 The fact that issues of state and federal law must be separated and decided by different courts means 
that these issues must be decided sequentially. See Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and 
Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998) (describing the importance of the 
sequence of decisionmaking to legal argument); see also Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the 
 
 Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication 15 
other court receives back the other court’s opinion(s), ought it simply to use the 
resolutions of the constituent issues to resolve the entire case, or should it take into 
account the views of the other court (whether expressed implicitly or explicitly) as to the 
proper resolution of the entire case?  
Decomposition poses difficulties across the range of transjurisdictional procedural 
devices.  
 
Certification.— It might seem at first that certification presents an easy setting for state 
courts, in that the certifying federal court will state precisely the questions to be asked 
and the state court simply answers those legal questions. Such a view is grounded on 
fundamental misapprehensions about the workings of certification. In important ways, it 
is the case, and not just the certified questions, that goes to the state high court.  That 
state high courts as a rule decline certification requests absent a sufficiently developed 
factual record shows that state courts answer—and, indeed, will only answer—certified 
questions in context.63 And the parties to the actual case submit briefs to, and argue the 
case before, the state high court.64 Thus, certification procedure in practice is far removed 
from consideration of abstract legal issues in a vacuum. In addition, the state courts 
remain free to rephrase the questions asked by the federal court,65 leaving at least some 
power of decomposition in the hands of the state courts.  
The difficulties of issue decomposition in certification cases come to a head 
where state courts are asked to deal with certified questions of state law that arise 
precisely because certain answers to the certified questions (but not others) will avoid 
federal constitutional issues. Consider the common setting in which a federal court is 
called upon to determine the federal constitutionality of a state statute. The federal court 
certifies to the state high court the question of how the state statute should be interpreted. 
Lurking (at least in the background) is the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, the state 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1994) (emphasizing the 
importance of path dependence in legal reasoning). 
63 See supra text accompanying note 22.  
64 See supra note 23.  
65 See supra text accompanying note 23.  
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court will be fully aware that the issue of the proper interpretation of the state statute has 
arisen in the context of the constitutionality of the statute.   
One possibility is for the state court to consider the likely constitutionality of the 
statute in determining the interpretation of the statute. While the state court generally will 
recognize explicitly that it lacks authority to resolve issues of federal law, the state court 
opinion may nonetheless make reference to federal law, and in substance reveal how the 
state court believes the state law questions should be resolved in light of federal law. 
Consider Redgrave v. Boston Philharmonic Orchestra,66 where the issue arose in a 
federal case as to whether a particular application of a state statute would violate the First 
Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified 
interpretive questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; the questions were 
broadly worded and did not mention or allude to the federal constitutional issues.67 A 
fractured state court produced three opinions, none of which garnered a majority of votes. 
All three opinions answered the questions as phrased on their face, but then proceeded to 
note concerns, grounded in federal and/or state constitutional law, that the federal case 
(though not the certified questions standing alone) raised.68 The federal court then 
divided over whether to accept the answers to the certified questions at face value, or 
whether to consider the state court judges’ musings on the broader case, ultimately 
deciding that it would.69  
Consider as well the response of the Maryland Court of Appeals to a certified 
question in Telnikoff v. Matusevitch.70 At issue in Telnikoff was the enforceability under 
Maryland law of a British libel judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc), incorporating answers to certified questions provided by 502 
N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. 1987). 
67 See id. at 902.  
68 See 502 N.E.2d at 1377 (Hennessey, C.J., plurality opinion) (noting the serious constitutional 
questions raised by the setting in which certified questions were asked, and noting that the judges would 
nonetheless answered the certified questions “in accordance with their clear and unequivocal wording”); id. 
at 1380 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (“[S]ubstantial constitutional questions may be explicitly, and surely are 
impliedly, involved in the questions”); id. at 1382 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Chief Justice’s opinion 
recognizes . . . that its answers to the certified questions may implicate serious constitutional 
questions . . . .”).  
69 See 855 F.2d at 903 (“Although all of the Justices’ reflections on this issue technically may fall under 
the heading of dicta, they are so deliberate, so unanimously expressed, and involve such a basic 
proposition, that we feel constrained to listen carefully.”).  
70 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).  
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District of Columbia Circuit asked the Maryland high court to resolve whether 
recognition of the foreign judgment would “be repugnant to the public policy of 
Maryland,” and therefore unenforceable under Maryland’s version of the Uniform 
Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act.71 The Maryland Court of Appeals answered 
the certified question in the affirmative, noting that it was not resolving issues of either 
federal or state constitutional law, but rather interpreting the applicable judgment 
recognition statute.72 But, the court added, “[w]hile we shall rest our decision in this case 
upon the non-constitutional ground of Maryland public policy, nonetheless, in 
ascertaining that public policy, it is appropriate to examine and rely upon the history, 
policies, and requirements of the First Amendment [to the federal Constitution] and [its 
Maryland constitutional analog].”73 And, indeed, the court’s subsequent analysis includes 
numerous references to, and analysis of, general First Amendment law.74  
A second possibility is for the state court to conclude that issues of federal law are 
beyond the proper scope of the federal court’s certification, as did the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana in Aguillard v. Green.75 There, the federal courts were asked to rule upon the 
constitutionality of a state statute that required the teaching of creation science along with 
evolution, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit called upon the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana to decide, as a preliminary matter, “whether the 1974 
Louisiana Constitution by vesting the responsibility exclusively in [the state Board of 
Elementary and Secondary Education] prohibits the Legislature from prescribing courses 
of study in elementary and secondary public schools.”76 Without so much as alluding to 
the federal constitutional issue ultimately driving the case, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana answered the question in the affirmative and upheld the statute on state 
constitutional grounds. Dissenting, Chief Justice Dixon asserted that the two issues were 
inextricably linked,77 while Justice Watson, also dissenting, explicitly cited cases from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
71 Id. at 236.  
72 Id. at 239.  
73 Id.  
74 See, e.g., id. at 244-47.  
75 440 So. 2d 704 (La. 1983).  
76 Id. at 706.  
77 See id. at 711 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting) (“Perhaps because the litigants have not forcefully presented 
the issue, and have submitted to a division of the question, this court avoids the hard issue at the root of that 
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other jurisdictions that had stricken similar statutes as unconstitutional under the federal 
Constitution.78 
A third possibility is for the state court to conclude that the certification 
improperly calls upon it to address matters of federal law. For example, in In re Certified 
Question from the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan,79 the 
Supreme Court of Michigan was asked by a federal district court to interpret a state 
indecent exposure statute; as the certification request made clear, the federal court would 
determine the constitutionality of the statute under the First Amendment based upon the 
state court’s response. The state court declined to answer the certified question. Reasoned 
the court: 
 
[I]t is plain that the certified question procedure has not been 
employed to obtain an expression of this Court’s opinion on a matter of 
Michigan law at all, or, even simply to obtain this Court’s opinion [as to 
how the statute should be interpreted]. It has been employed instead to 
obtain a ruling from this Court on a question of First Amendment federal 
constitutional law with very explicit instructions from the federal court to 
this Court how that answer should be written to avoid federal court 
adjudication that the statute is unconstitutional.80  
 
To the extent that certification is simply a streamlined form of abstention,81 then 
perhaps the first option described above is best—that is, for the state court to consider the 
proper interpretation of the statute in light of any relevant federal constitutional 
provisions: The Court has explained that Pullman abstention procedure “does not mean 
                                                                                                                                                                             
one certified to us. It assumes that ‘creation-science’ is a ‘course of study.’”); id. (“From all that I have read 
in the past, ‘creation-science’ is a religious doctrine, not a course of study.”).  
78 See id. at 713 (Watson, J., dissenting).  
79 359 N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1984).  
80 Id. at 516. The court further explained: 
The rhetorical questions, of course, are by what authority does this Court tell the federal court 
how the litigation before it challenging the constitutionality of our statute, should be decided and 
by what authority does this Court “save” the statute from the probability of federal court 
nullification by ruling on its constitutionality? There is no litigation before this Court challenging 
the constitutionality of the statute. Indeed, there is no lawsuit on the matter before this Court at 
all. There is a mere request for an advisory opinion not about “Michigan law” as is required by 
[the Michigan certification statute], but about the constitutionality of a Michigan statute under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, a question of federal constitutional law, 
thinly veiled behind a purported request to advise the federal court [how the statute should be 
interpreted], accompanied by advice as to precisely how the question should be answered. 
Id.  
81 See supra text accompanying note 18.  
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that a party must litigate his federal claims in the state courts, but only that he must 
inform those courts what his federal claims are, so that the state statute may be construed 
‘in light of’ those claims.”82 But, if that is so, how should the federal court “reassemble” 
a case after a state court has answered certified questions? In the Redgrave case, the First 
Circuit decided to consider the views of the Justices of the Massachusetts high court 
beyond simply the answers to the certified questions.83 While this may be the correct 
path, it is interesting to note, from the perspective of difficulties that result from case 
decomposition, that the First Circuit had to resolve the case en banc, and that two of the 
five sitting judges vociferously dissented, arguing that the First Circuit should be bound 
by the simple votes of the Massachusetts high court judges as to whether to answer the 
certified questions “yes” or “no”.84  
 
Abstention.—Abstention presents a complicated procedure for case decomposition. When 
a federal court abstains under Pullman, the state court has full authority to resolve state 
and federal issues unless a litigant clearly reserves the federal issues for federal court85 
and properly preserves those issues by not litigating them in the state forum.86 If a litigant 
properly makes an England reservation, then the state court lacks the power to resolve 
federal issues. Indeed, if the state court nonetheless proceeds to resolve federal law issues 
over the litigant’s objection, that resolution is not binding upon return to the federal court. 
In short, then, the state court initially decomposes the case; if the federal court disagrees 
with that decomposition, however, and concludes that the state court overstepped its 
bounds, then the federal court’s “re-decomposition” controls.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
82 England, 375 U.S. at 420; see Randall P. Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation of 
Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1116 (1974) (noting that, under Pullman abstention, “the state 
court is not prohibited from considering the state law issue in light of the federal issue”).  
83 See 855 F.2d at 903 (“Although all of the Justices’ reflections on this issue technically may fall under 
the heading of dicta, they are so deliberate, so unanimously expressed, and involve such a basic 
proposition, that we feel constrained to listen carefully.”). The First Circuit proceeded to reason that, even 
though the Massachusetts high court had fractured into three camps, none of which constituted a majority, 
one could extrapolate that all the Justices would agree on ultimate outcome. See id. at 909-10. The First 
Circuit also indicated that, even if that extrapolation were not accurate, the concurrence combined with the 
dissent to form a majority on outcome. See id. at 909.  
84 See id. at 912 (Bownes, J., dissenting).  
85 See supra text accompanying note 14.  
86 See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 340-41 (2005) (England 
reservation ineffective where parties advanced federal constitutional arguments before state court).  
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Abstention presents the same legal decomposition challenges as does 
certification,87 but, unlike certification, also raises two other concerns: factfinding and 
preclusion. Consider first the problem of decomposing factual issues. While certification 
generally envisions state courts responding to certified questions only in the light of a 
fully developed factual record, the procedure in no way calls upon or allows the state 
court to render factual findings. Abstention, in contrast, calls upon the state court not only 
to resolve the state law issues but also the factual questions underlying those issues. And, 
just as the state court is precluded (assuming a valid England reservation) from resolving 
issues of federal law, so too is it precluded from resolving the factual questions 
underlying those issues.88 As I noted above, at the end of the day, the federal court may 
disagree with the state court’s efforts to disaggregate the relevant legal and factual issues, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
87 On one reading, England reservation simply allows for litigants to reserve for review in federal courts 
federal claims—that is, claims arising under federal law—while allowing for state court resolution of state 
law claims. See, e.g., England, 375 U.S. at 415 (“There are fundamental objections to any conclusion that a 
litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal 
constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept 
instead a state court’s determination of those claims.” (emphasis added)); id. at 417 (noting a litigant’s 
“right to litigate his federal claims fully in the federal courts” (emphasis added). On this understanding 
then, cases are “naturally” decomposed, based simply on whether each claim arises under state or federal 
law. On the other hand, language elsewhere in England suggests that the federal reservation applies to 
federal law questions, not claims. See, e.g., id. at 415-16 (recognizing “the primacy of the federal judiciary 
in deciding questions of federal law”). Professor Field is similarly ambiguous, compare Field, supra note 
58, at 1079 (England “held that a litigant remanded to state court under that doctrine cannot be compelled 
to submit his federal claims for state court disposition. . . .” (emphasis added)) with id. (“[A]bstention may 
not be used to deprive [a litigant invoking a reservation] of the benefits of an initial federal determination 
of the federal issues. . . .” (emphasis added)), as is Professor Friedman, compare, e.g., Friedman, supra 
note 28, at 1271 (“Federal jurisdiction should be available for federal claims.” (emphasis added)) with id. at 
1269 (“So long as the state party indicates that it intends to obtain litigation of federal questions in federal 
court, that reservation should be enough.” (emphasis added)). I believe the England is better understood to 
apply to federal issues, not claims. Indeed, England itself involved a case where, when three would-be 
chiropractors sued for a declaration that a Louisiana statute that forbade them from practicing in Louisiana 
was violative of the federal Constitution, the federal court abstained pending state court determination of 
whether the statute applied to the plaintiffs (the resolution of which question might obviate the need to 
resolve the federal constitutional issue). England recognized the right of litigants to reserve for federal 
court review not entire claims, but rather questions of federal law that might be subsets of claims.  
88 E.g., Field, supra note 58, at 1079. Compare, in this regard, the use of Pullman abstention with the 
use of Burford abstention, where the decision to abstain in favor of state court litigation (including state 
court factfinding) is based in part on the state court’s “superior factfinding abilities.” Bezanson, supra note 
82, at 1123-24. Note as well that, when the Supreme Court reviews a state court’s resolution of federal law 
on certiorari, it generally accepts the state court system’s factfinding, even though that factfinding may 
influence the ultimate resolution of the federal issue. See Field, supra note 58, at 1084.  
It may be that some (or all) of the factual questions that underlie the state law issues that the state court 
properly resolves also underlie the federal law issues. In such cases, the question arises whether issue 
preclusion may bind the federal court to the state court’s factual conclusions. For an argument that it does, 
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in which case the federal court’s views will control—that is to say, the federal court will 
not be bound under England by the state court’s findings. At the same time, however, as I 
shall discuss presently, preclusion doctrine may vest additional power in state court 
factfinding.  
Turning to preclusion, the Supreme Court held in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & 
County of San Francisco that the full faith and credit statute89 requires federal courts to 
give preclusive effect to state court holdings, even where the plaintiff is forced to raise 
claims in state court in order to have her federal claims ripen, and even where the 
plaintiff proceeds in state court while the federal court abstains under Pullman90 and 
where the plaintiff makes an England reservation.91 As a result, issue preclusion 
generally binds an abstaining federal court to a state court’s findings, that are necessary 
to the state court’s holding, on issues of evidentiary fact, and issues of “ultimate fact”—
that is, put broadly, law applied to fact.92  
                                                                                                                                                                             
see Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 272-76 
(2006).  
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).  
90 See 545 U.S. at 341-47. Under the Court’s holding in Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, federal takings claims do not ripen until a state fails “to 
provide adequate compensation for the taking.” 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). After the district court relied on 
Williamson County to hold the plaintiffs’ taking claim untimely, the plaintiffs in San Remo asked the Ninth 
Circuit to abstain under Pullman while the plaintiffs pursued an inverse condemnation action in the 
California state courts and thus ripened their federal claim. 545 U.S. at 330-31. After losing on the merits in 
state court, the district court and subsequently the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal takings 
claim, this time relying upon the issue preclusive effect of the state court’s ruling. Id. at 332-35. The 
Supreme Court affirmed.  
91 While noting that the plaintiffs had raised arguments inconsistent with their invocation of England, 
the Court observed that its holding on the lack of an exception to the full faith and credit statute did not turn 
on England. See id. at 341-42.  
92 See Sterk, supra note 88, at 273-74 &.121.  
Though issue preclusion also applies generally to pure matters of law, see id., that will presumably not 
be of moment in the abstention setting where an England reservation is properly invoked: Any pure legal 
questions resolved should be matters of state law, which by definition the federal court will not be 
confronting. See id. at 273-74 (explaining why “according issue-preclusive effect to a state court 
determination of law . . . will not generally prevent a landowner from mounting a federal takings challenge 
in federal court”). If, on the other hand, the state court improperly addresses a matter of federal law, the San 
Remo Court did hold that the England reservation (assuming it is properly preserved) will deny preclusive 
effect to the state court’s determination. See id. at 280.  
Though it is less likely, claim preclusion could also present a problem. Under claim preclusion, a federal 
court may be barred from hearing a claim—even a federal claim—if the plaintiff has first proceeded in state 
court and could have brought in that forum the federal claim along with a closely related state claim, but 
chose not to do so. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83-84 (1984). Absent an 
exception for England reservations, it would seem that exercises of Pullman abstention might often give 
rise to assertions of claim preclusion—for example, in cases where claims are raised under analogous 
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Supreme Court Certiorari Review of State Court Cases.—Difficulties in decomposition 
also may arise under Supreme Court certiorari review of state court decisions. One might 
think that manifestation of those difficulties would be rare, insofar as the Supreme Court 
both decides upon the proper decomposition of the case and then has the freedom not just 
to resolve the federal issues but to decide the case itself. Consider, however, two areas of 
possible problem. 
First, how should the Supreme Court decide whether independent issues of federal 
law abound in a state court decision? In theory, “where the judgment of a state court rests 
upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, 
[Supreme Court] jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal 
ground and adequate to support the judgment.”93 However, since its 1983 decision in 
Michigan v. Long,94 the Court has applied a presumption that there is no independent and 
adequate state law ground “when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court 
relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the 
state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.”95  
This had the effect of expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to review state court 
cases, but also of increasing the likelihood that state courts on remand would adhere to 
their earlier decision on the ground that it was, contrary to the Court’s presumption, based 
                                                                                                                                                                             
federal and state constitutional provisions. E.g., San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 
F.3d 1095, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1998) (abstaining from plaintiffs’ facial federal takings claim pending state 
court litigation).  
Does England reservation provide an exception to application of claim preclusion? As Professor Sterk 
notes, while “[t]he Supreme Court’s opinion in San Remo did not expressly determine whether the hotel’s 
effort to litigate its federal takings claim in federal court was foreclosed by the doctrine of claim preclusion 
or by the doctrine of issue preclusion,” Sterk, supra 88, at 272, “[n]othing in the Court’s analytical 
framework distinguishes issue preclusion from claim preclusion,” and “Section 1738 applies equally to 
claim preclusion and issue preclusion,” id. at 280. Nonetheless, Professor Sterk concedes that, for an 
England reservation to be effective, it must trump: “When a federal court properly invokes the abstention 
doctrine, a state court judgment rendered after an England reservation will have neither issue preclusive 
effect nor claim preclusive effect in a subsequent federal adjudication of federal claims.” Id. at 280.  
At the same time, Professor Sterk argues that, when “no ground for abstention exists, England 
reservations are not authorized and can operate to trump neither state issue preclusion doctrine nor state 
claim preclusion doctrine.” Id. This point, if true, has ramifications for Professor Friedman’s proposal to 
allow for anticipatory England reservations, see supra text accompanying note 14, as I discuss below, see 
infra notes 185-192 and accompanying text.  
93 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).  
94 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).  
95 Id. at 1042.  
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on an independent and adequate state law ground.96 In this sense, the Michigan v. Long 
presumption is a decomposition device, but one that state courts may, and often do, rebut.  
Consider, moreover, the lengths to which state courts may go to preserve their 
decisions as grounded on an independent state law basis. In Racing Association of 
Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald,97 the Iowa Supreme Court held that a state tax on gambling 
receipts from racetracks at nearly twice the rate imposed on receipts from riverboat 
gambling violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and an analogous 
provision of the Iowa Constitutions. The court noted that the “same analysis” applied to 
determining the applicability of both provisions.98 The United States Supreme Court, by 
writ of certiorari, reversed the state court’s federal constitutional holding and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.99 On remand, the Iowa Supreme Court adhered to its 
original decision on state law grounds.100 The state court expressly declined to hold that 
the Iowa Constitution required a different analytical framework from federal law to 
evaluate equal protection claims,101 holding instead that the rational basis test, which was 
the governing standard under federal law, applied as well under Iowa law but demanded a 
different outcome.102 
The upshot in defying Supreme Court authority to decompose cases is simply to 
decline to fulfill the Court’s mandate on remand. Though rare, this did happen in the case 
of Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, Inc.103 There, the Court reversed the Supreme Court 
of Nebraska’s mandate in a state law fraud case that the parties do “all things necessary” 
to achieve return of a radio station license,104 reasoning that license ownership lay within 
                                                                                                                                                                             
96 See Richard W. Westling, Note, Advisory Opinions and the “Constitutionally Required” Adequate 
and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 63 TUL. L. REV. 379, 389 n.47 (1988) (calculating that 26.7% of 
Supreme Court decisions reviewing state court rulings proved to be advisory opinions in the four-and-one-
half years following Long, compared to 14.3% in the five-and-one-half years preceding Long).  
97 648 N.W.2d 555, 562 (Iowa 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 103 (2003), on remand to 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 
2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004).  
98 Id. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 539 U.S. 103 (2003).  
100 675 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004).  
101 See id. at 5-6. 
102 See id. at 6-16.  
103 13 N.W.2d 556 (Neb.), reh’g denied, 14 N.W. 666 (1944), rev’d, 326 U.S. 120 (1945), on remand to 
19 N.W.2d 853 (1945).  
104 Id. at 564. 
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the sole purview of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).105 In formulating 
the appropriate relief, the Court recognized the state court’s power to adjudicate fraud, 
but also was concerned that a state court order that resulted in the separation of the FCC 
radio license from the underlying physical property might “result . . . in the termination of 
a broadcasting station,” which in turn might “deprive[] the public of those advantages 
which presumably led the Commission to grant a license” in the first place.106 The Court 
sought to vindicate these competing interests in fashioning relief: “We think that State 
power is amply respected if it is qualified merely to the extent of requiring it to withhold 
execution of that portion of its decree requiring retransfer of the physical properties until 
steps are ordered to be taken, with all deliberate speed, to enable the Commission to deal 
with new applications in connection with the station.”107 The Court remanded the case 
“for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”108 
On remand, the Supreme Court of Nebraska opined that the United States 
Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds by deciding a matter of state law.109 The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
105 326 U.S. at 130.  
Johnson involved the lease of radio station and the transfer of the station’s license by the fraternal 
society that owned the station to a corporate entity. A member of the society sued the fraternal society and 
the corporation in Nebraska state court on his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the society, 
raising allegations of fraud, and asking the court to set aside the transfer of the lease and the assignment of 
the license. 13 N.W.2d at 557. While the suit was pending, the FCC exercised its supervisory authority over 
the station license and approved of the assignment. 326 U.S. at 121.  
While the trial court found no fraud and dismissed the suit, the state supreme court reversed and 
“ordered that the lease to the station, the lease to the space occupied by the station and the transfer of the 
license to operate the station be vacated and set aside.” 13 N.W.2d at 564. On motion for rehearing, the 
defendants argued that the state court improperly exercised jurisdiction properly belonging to the FCC. The 
supreme court denied that motion as untimely, but did clarify its opinion as follows: “The effect of our 
former opinion was to vacate the lease of the radio station and to order a return of the property to its former 
status, the question of the federal license being a question solely for the Federal Communications 
Commission. Our former opinion should be so construed.” 14 N.W.2d at 669.  
The United States Supreme Court granted defendants’ petition for certiorari “[b]ecause of the 
importance of the contention that the State court’s decision had invaded the domain of the Federal 
Communications Commission.” 326 U.S. at 123. The Court declined to address the defendants’ primary 
argument—that the state court exercised jurisdiction that was vested solely in the FCC—on the ground that 
the state court’s ruling that the argument was raised belatedly constituted an independent and adequate state 
law ground. 326 U.S. at 123. However, reasoning that ownership of the license lay within the sole purview 
of the FCC, the Supreme Court explained that the state supreme court “went outside its bounds when it 
ordered the parties ‘to do all things necessary’ to secure a return of the license.” Id. at 130 (quoting 
Johnson, 13 N.W.2d at 564).  
106 Id. at 131-32.  
107 326 U.S. at 132. The Court added: “Of course, the question of fraud adjudicated by the State court 
will no longer be open insofar as it bears upon the reliability as licensee of any of the parties.” Id.  
108 Id. at 133. 
109 19 N.W.2d 853.  
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Nebraska court recognized the Supreme Court’s authority to decide whether the Nebraska 
court had encroached upon the FCC’s authority, but it identified that as the “only possible 
basis for the attaching of federal jurisdiction.”110 It understood the Supreme Court’s 
decision to go farther “The mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States directing 
this court to withhold its mandate of the state court encroaches upon the plenary powers 
of this court and tends to undermine the autonomy and destroy the independence of the 
state courts in a field in which they are admittedly supreme.”111 The Nebraska court 
proceeded to characterize the “contention” advanced by the Supreme Court—“that state 
power is amply respected, even if it is qualified to the extent of requiring the withholding 
of execution” of a portion of the Court’s decree—as “specious.”112 The court concluded: 
“The mandate of this court will . . . issue on order by this court without reference to the 
advisory directions contained in the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”113 
Last, consider that state courts may so wish to preserve their holding that they 
may seek to evade the reviewing power of the Supreme Court. On this basis, the Supreme 
Court has developed the doctrine that it may review state court decisions purportedly 
grounded in state law where the issue of state law is antecedent to a question of federal 
law,114 or where the Supreme Court suspects the state court of having devised its 
determination of state law so as to evade or cheat federal law or federal judicial review.115 
 
* * * 
 
A final point of difficulty raised by case decomposition relates to the difficulties 
courts tend to have in resolving less than entire cases. The natural tendency of courts is to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
110 Id. at 854.  
111 Id. The Nebraska court evidently believed that its opinion on rehearing adequately preserved the 
FCC’s authority over the license.  
112 Id. at 854-55. 
113 Id. at 855.  
After the Supreme Court of Nebraska adhered to its earlier decision, the parties agreed to a new lease. 
The case was not pursued again to the United States Supreme Court. Note, Evasion of Supreme Court 
Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, supra note 13, at 1253 n.15.  
One presumes that, had the case again been reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Court would have been 
free to enforce its original mandate. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
114 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).  
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decide cases based upon final outcomes, not constituent issues.116 At some level, 
decomposition conflicts with this natural tendency.117 And the examples I have identified 
bear this out. The courts in Johnson focused on outcome at every level.118 The Iowa 
Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court wrestled over the outcome of the case 
in Fitzgerald.119 By relying upon the state law issue, the Iowa Supreme Court was able to 
reaffirm its earlier outcome and reject the United States Supreme Court’s outcome. And 
Redgrave elucidates the tendency toward deciding outcomes in the context of 
certification.120  
 
B. Problems of Bias 
 
The ordinary story is that the Constitution authorizes, and Congress has conferred, 
federal court diversity jurisdiction on the grounds (or at least substantially on the 
grounds) that state courts are biased against out-of-state residents—or are perceived to be 
so, even if in fact they are not.121 In this sense, as expressed through Congress’ decision 
                                                                                                                                                                             
115 See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court 
State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002).  
116 See STEARNS, supra note 61, at 111-24 (arguing that judges’ general preference for outcome-based 
voting is the result of natural evolution in decisionmaking).  
117 See England, 375 U.S. at 421 n.12 (“It has been suggested that state courts may ‘take no more 
pleasure than do federal courts in deciding cases piecemeal * * *’ and ‘probably prefer to determine their 
questions of law with complete records of cases in which they can enter final judgments before them.’” 
(quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
118 First, the Nebraska state court announced a preliminary outcome in the case. After the Supreme 
Court identified a federal issue on which it had authority to rule, the Court proceeded to modify the 
outcome in the case to incorporate its ruling on the federal law issue. On remand, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court rejected the Supreme Court’s issue distinction and reinstated the outcome it previously had 
announced. While issue decomposition provided a substantial ground for dispute between the courts, it was 
ultimately through the outcome in the case that the Supreme Court sought to assert its authority, and it was 
the outcome of the case that the Nebraska Supreme Court sought to protect. See supra notes 103-113 and 
accompanying text.  
119 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.  
120 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.  
121 Though the justifications for the constitutional and congressional grants of diversity jurisdiction are 
myriad and subject to debate, still it remains the case that avoiding bias and the appearance of bias are, at 
the least, two of the principal justifications. See Nash, supra note 16, at 1729 n.223, and the authorities 
cited therein. See also id. at 1730 n.224 (arguing that the affirmative choice to retain diversity jurisdiction 
in the face of arguments to repeal it reflects at least some belief that the risk of bias and perceived bias 
remains somewhat vibrant). While some argue that the diversity jurisdiction proved to be invaluable for the 
economic and commercial development of the country, see, e.g., Adrienne J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: 
Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 197, 206-10 (1982); William Howard 
Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 604 
(1922), that point ultimately may rest on the perception of bias, see Taft, supra, at 604 (“The material 
question is not so much whether the justice administered [in state courts with respect to litigants from other 
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to instantiate the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, federal courts are in certain 
circumstances seen to be better fora for state court claims than are state courts.122  
To the extent that state courts are biased against out-of-state residents, state and 
federal courts do not, and should not decide state law claims identically: While Erie 
directs that federal courts decide state law questions as would the relevant state high 
court, that directive implicitly includes an exception for bias against litigants that state 
courts themselves might exhibit. The implicit justification is that state courts may 
manipulate state law—that is, apply state law to achieve a different outcome—when at 
least one of the parties hails from out-of-state. 
On the other hand, to the extent that state courts are in reality (either broadly or in 
particular cases) not biased against out-of-state residents but run the risk of being 
perceived to be so, the fact that federal and state courts will decide state law issues in the 
same way (as Erie otherwise directs) will serve to dispel the incorrect perceptions of bias, 
and to bolster and indeed to legitimate state court decisions on matters of state law in 
other cases.  
To the extent that they allow for resolution in state court, in whole or in part, of 
state law claims that are otherwise to be heard in federal court—especially those in 
federal court by virtue of the diversity jurisdiction—transjurisdictional procedural 
devices frustrate the attainment of these goals. In other words, while one might dispute 
either the suggestion that state courts are often biased, the suggestion that they are often 
perceived to be biased, or both, the fact that the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regions of the country] is actually impartial and fair, as it is whether it is thought to be so by those who are 
considering the wisdom of investing their capital in states where their capital is needed for the promotion of 
enterprises and industrial and commercial progress.”). 
122 Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1421-22 (arguing that perhaps federal courts are better suited to decide 
state constitutional law issues, based in part upon the argument that a “federal court’s familiarity with 
constitutional adjudication might compensate for its potential unfamiliarity with some aspects of state 
law”); Marsh, supra note 121, at 212 (“[C]ontinued heavy use of diversity jurisdiction has been cited as 
evidence of its continuing need to overcome the perceived shortcomings of the state courts.” (footnote 
omitted)). The converse is generally not seen to be true; that is, there is no sustained argument that state 
courts provide a better forum for federal law claims across a wide swath of cases. Indeed, commentators 
generally argue that federal courts provide at least as good, if not a better, forum for the vindication of 
federal civil rights claims. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). 
Still, there are some who argue that state courts in particular contexts and at particular times may offer a 
friendlier forum. See William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599 (1999); 
Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1123 (“In virtually every Burford abstention case the Supreme Court has . . . 
emphasized the reliability of the state court adjudicatory process in the resolution of the issues presented.”).  
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remains “on the books” suggests that decisions to send state law claims that otherwise 
would be wholly resolved in federal court back, in whole or in part, to state court should 
not be taken lightly. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that “the difficulties of 
ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in 
themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision.”123 Rather, “[i]n 
the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the exercise of 
the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it 
has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is 
properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of 
a judgment.”124  And, indeed, other than recognizing the propriety of certification and 
very limited applications of abstention doctrine,125 the Supreme Court has generally 
adhered to this view. The introduction of certain new transjurisdictional procedural 
devices, and expansion and increased use of existing ones, are inconsistent with this 
view.  
One might argue that certification—unlike procedural devices such as abstention 
that allow for state court systems to address cases in their entirety—adequately protects 
against state court bias in three ways. First, certification involves only judges of the 
state’s highest court, and those judges are less likely to exhibit bias (or to be perceived to 
exhibit bias) than are lower state court judges. Second, any use of a jury takes place in 
federal court with a jury drawn from a federal jury pool. This, too, reduces the likelihood 
of bias, of the perception of bias. And, third, all factfinding takes place in the federal 
court; state courts on certification decide only abstract questions of state law, leaving the 
opportunities for bias quite small.  
None of these arguments (whether alone, or taken together) establishes that bias, 
or the perception of bias, will be eliminated under certification procedure. First, it is 
simply not the case that a state’s high court judges are less likely to be biased, or to be 
perceived to be biased. To the contrary, the fact that high court judges are not bound by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
123 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. at 234.  
124 Id.  
125 See supra note 28 and the accompanying text.  
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precedent affords them greater leeway to engage in bias.126 And the fact that many 
members of state courts of last resort are elected raises the specter of bias or at least of its 
appearance.127  
Second, while jury determinations will be made in federal court, the possibility of 
bias extends beyond juries to state tribunals.128 Indeed, the fact that federal juries, like 
state juries, are drawn from the residents of the state in which the federal court is located 
(albeit from a wider swath of the state) has led defenders of federal diversity jurisdiction 
to argue that the source of bias is not so much the jury itself but rather the power the trial 
judge exercises in controlling and instructing the jury.129  
Third, the notion that state high courts answer certified questions in a vacuum is 
incorrect. Indeed, the cognate point—that all factfinding takes place in federal court—
itself undermines the notion that the state court responds to abstract legal questions. 
Rather, the fact that state high courts as a rule decline certification requests absent a 
sufficiently developed factual record shows that state courts answer—and, indeed, will 
only answer—certified questions in context. This leaves the state court the freedom to 
distinguish the certified answers in subsequent opinions. At the same time, however, the 
setting of certification gives the state high court the cover to claim that it is simply 
answering abstract legal questions, making the potential for bias (or the appearance of 
bias) especially invidious.130 As Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins 
explain, “the risk of bias against a nonresident in the interpretation of untested state law 
may be even greater than in cases of routine law application to disputed facts.”131 
                                                                                                                                                                             
126 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1743. Indeed, the large sums of money expended, and attention focused, 
on races for seats on state high courts is evidence of the great discretion that state high court judges enjoy. 
See id.  
127 See id. at 1742-43.  
While serving as a West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, Richard Neely wrote: 
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state 
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s 
money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their 
friends will reelect me.  
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 4 (1988).  
128 Congress presumably could decide, but has not decided, to extend diversity jurisdiction solely to 
cases that involve jury trials.  
129 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1741, and the authorities cited therein.  
130 See id. at 1743-45.  
131 Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. 
L. REV. 613, 677 (1999).  
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This risk, moreover, is not merely theoretical; it has in fact come to pass. As I 
detail elsewhere, in a pair of cases, the Supreme Court of Texas initially answered 
certified questions in what appeared to be a broad statement of law, only two years later 
to issue an opinion that relegated the certified answers to the facts there presented.132 
Without ascribing intentional bias to the judges of the Texas court (and recalling that the 
mere appearance of bias is problematic), the fact remains that the net result of the two 
opinions was to treat an in-state litigant more favorably than a similarly-situated out-of-
state litigant. 
Professor Friedman has suggested that the real question is whether the state 
court’s holdings are general statements of law, broadly applicable without regard to 
citizenship.133 I do not disagree with this general point. Indeed, I suggest below that such 
a metric might be used to determine whether the federal court should be bound by a state 
court’s response to a certified question. 
 
C. Disparity in Judicial System Power 
 
The successful use of transjurisdictional procedural devices rests upon one of two 
bases (or a combination thereof): comity between the two judicial systems implicated by 
the use of the device, and/or the power of one of the two judicial systems to employ the 
device. Insofar as they tend to understand transjurisdictional devices to further comity 
among judicial systems, commentators tend to assume (if implicitly) that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
132 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1745-47 (discussing Lucas v. Untied States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 
1988), and Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990)).  
133 Professor Friedman argues that, “[e]ven in the case [that I] discuss[], the subsequent ruling was itself 
general, and the body of law now contains the general principles from those two cases, principles that will 
apply without regard to the citizenship of parties.” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1239 n.72. The problem, 
however, is that the first opinion—that is, the response to the certified questions—what to all appearances 
purported to be a general statement of law turned out not to be. one well might have said—erroneously, as 
it turned out—that the first decision by the Texas court was “general” such that the “body of law . . . 
contains the general principles” from that case. This begs the question: What exactly constitutes “general 
principles” in this context? More importantly, the ultimate question is whether state courts treat responses 
to certified questions differently from their other opinions.  
Professor Friedman also questions the importance of the example I offer, arguing that I “give[] no idea 
how pervasive the phenomenon is, and there is room to be skeptical.” Id. It is true that I make no assertion, 
and offer no evidence, as to how pervasive the phenomenon is, but neither does Professor Friedman offer 
evidence of how constrained it is. Ultimately, while the question indeed is an empirical one, in my view it 
is not clear on whose shoulders the burden of proof should fall. The point in any event remains that the 
Texas cases demonstrate that the phenomenon is not purely theoretical. However frequently it may occur 
now, moreover, increased use of certification would make its occurrence more likely. See infra page 41.  
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transjurisdictional devices they endorse rest upon and further comity. And, indeed, 
comity is the stronger base on which to design a transjurisdictional device. The problem, 
however, is that the existing commentary fails adequately to analyze the degree to which 
existing or proposed devices in fact rest upon comity, as opposed to disparities in power. 
As a general matter, the federal court system enjoys a considerable power 
advantage over the various state judicial systems. First, federal law is expressly binding 
upon all state courts by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.134 Second, the federal courts are 
part of the federal government and, as such, sit atop their state court counterparts much as 
the federal government sits atop state governments. Third, all state courts are directly 
inferior to a part of the federal court system: the United States Supreme Court. By 
contrast, the federal courts only need to apply state law by virtue of the Court’s decision 
in Erie,135 and then only when Congress has seen fit to extend jurisdiction over questions 
of state law. And, further, one can see congressional action to authorize (or require) 
federal courts to hear state law claims as a further example of federal court power over 
state courts, insofar as state courts have no say in the matter and in effect are required to 
share jurisdiction with the federal courts, and indeed effectively to lose the right to 
adjudicate cases that otherwise would fall under their purview.136 Fourth, federal courts 
may stay actions in state court under appropriate circumstances,137 but state courts may 
not as a general matter stay actions in federal court.138 Fifth, federal courts trying to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
134 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.  
135 See supra note 27; see also Clark, supra note 17, at 1477 & n.92 (questioning whether the result in 
Erie is constitutionally required); W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1487, 1513 n.105 (2004), and the authorities cited therein (same).  
136 Courts of a state also share jurisdiction in this sense with courts of another system, and also generally 
do not have a final say in the interpretation of state law, when matters arising under the law of that state are 
litigated in the courts of another state. In both cases, the state courts are not divested of jurisdiction, but 
also do not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction.  
137 The Anti-Injunction Act states that a federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings 
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect and effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006). While it thus limits the 
circumstances under which federal courts may issue injunctions against state courts, see, e.g., Atlantic 
Coastline R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970) (describing the Act as 
“an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of 
three specifically defined exceptions”), still the Act confirms at the same time the power of federal courts 
to issue such injunctions.  
138 See, e.g., Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1964) (“While Congress has seen fit to 
authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances, it 
has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely 
without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions like the one here.” (footnotes 
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discern state law undertake an endeavor quite distinct from that undertaking by state 
courts asked to rule upon issues of federal law. Erie calls for federal courts to decide 
matters of state law as would the relevant state high court. While the leeway that this 
affords federal courts is open to debate,139 nonetheless it is clear that, at some level, the 
federal court must endeavor to act as it believes the state court would. In effect, if the 
Erie mandate is followed, the federal court can be said to act as the faithful agent of the 
state court.140 By contrast, the role of a state court faced with questions of federal law is 
different. While the state court should endeavor to decide the federal law issues 
“correctly” and while in some sense this may involve anticipating how the United States 
Supreme Court would decide the issues, it hardly seems accurate to describe the state 
court as acting the Supreme Court’s faithful agent.141  
Despite the evident power disparity, advocates of expanded transjurisdictional 
procedural devices rely upon cooperation between court systems to effectuate their goals. 
In other words, the commentators rely, if implicitly, upon Professor Edward Corwin’s 
pronouncement that the era of dual federalism—in which the federal government and 
state governments coexist but the relation between them “is one of tension rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                             
omitted)). See id. at 412-14 (invalidating state court order enjoining parties from prosecuting parallel suit in 
federal court, and vacating state court judgment of contempt for violation of order). But see Princess Lida 
of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465-68 (1939) (upholding a state court order enjoining 
litigants from pursuing relief in federal court on the ground that the state court had the power to protect its 
ability, to the exclusion of the federal court, to adjudicate the in rem case before it).  
139 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’ Interpretations 
of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 997-98 (2004) (identifying factors that federal courts sometimes 
consider in Erie analyses).  
140 Charging the federal court to act as the state court’s ‘faithful agent’ does not render it, in Judge 
Frank’s words, the “ventriloquist’s dummy” to the state court. See Richardson v. Comm’r, 126 F.2d 562, 
567 (2d Cir. 1942) (“[W]e are not here compelled by [Erie] to play the role of ventriloquist’s dummy to the 
courts of some particular state; as we understand it, ‘federal law,’' not ‘local law,’ is applicable.”) (Frank, 
J.); John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 13 (1963) (noting that the 
continuation of federal diversity jurisdiction is subject to the “ventriloquist’s dummy criticism,” and noting 
that the criticism “may have merit”); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 
651, 655 (1995) (“[N]o judge ought to be anyone’s ‘ventriloquist’s dummy,’ and any doctrine that does not 
recognize this merits serious reexamination.” (quoting Richardson, 126 F.2d at 567)). 
141 In addition to the points in the text, consider the argument that Supreme Court has deliberately 
carved out from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and thus left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
courts, matters that traditionally fall within the realm of the feminine. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, “Naturally” 
without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1699 (1991) 
(noting “the deliberate construction of jurisdictional rules and doctrine to exclude "domestic relations" from 
federal court authority”); id. at 1739-50.  
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collaboration”142—(if ever there was such an era) has passed.143 One ought not to 
presume, however, that the retreat of dual federalism leaves unabashed cooperative 
federalism in its stead. To whatever extent there ever was an era of cooperative 
federalism,144 it is “interactive federalism,” not cooperative federalism, that most aptly 
describes the relationship today between the federal judiciary and state court systems.145 
Just as the age of pure dual federalism may never have existed, so too is it an 
overstatement to describe today’s atmosphere as one of pure cooperative federalism.146 
Thus does interactive federalism “implicitly recognize the continued relevance of at least 
some form of dualism.”147  
Commentators have generally failed to acknowledge the mismatch between the 
suggestion to rely more heavily on transjurisdictional procedural devices on the one hand, 
and the reality of dual federalism on the other. In reality, all transjurisdictional procedural 
devices operate based upon voluntary cooperation, power disparity, or some combination 
thereof. The combinations vary, however. Certification relies more heavily on voluntary 
cooperation, while abstention and certiorari review rely more heavily on power 
disparity—and thus are more likely to create friction between the court systems.148  
                                                                                                                                                                             
142 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).  
143 See id. at 4-23.  
144 Compare Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404 (“Some have declared the end of the era of cooperative 
federalism. Others have merely called for its demise.” (footnotes omitted)); John Kincaid, Foreword: The 
New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 920 (1995) (referring to 
“the New Deal era of cooperative federalism (circa 1933-1968)”), with Redish, supra note 6, at 864 
(expressing skepticism as to whether cooperative federalism ever held sway).  
145 See Redish, supra note 6, at 874-88; MARTIN REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
29 (1995); Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive 
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 250-51 (2005).  
146 As the Supreme Court explained in Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970): 
While the lower federal courts were given certain powers in the 1789 Act, they were not given 
any power to review directly cases from state courts, and they have not been given such powers 
since that time. Only the Supreme Court was authorized to review on direct appeal the decisions 
of state courts. Thus from the beginning we have had in this country two essentially separate legal 
systems. Each system proceeds independently of the other with ultimate review in this Court of 
the federal questions raised in either system. Understandably this dual court system was bound to 
lead to conflicts and frictions. 
147 Redish, supra note 6, at 882. Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1404 (“The new phase of federalism . . . 
though, will place more emphasis than cooperative federalism on competition and even confrontation 
among the states and between the states and the national government.”).  
148 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (arguing that cooperation 
between governments is more effective than coercion).  
 Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication 34 
All three procedures vest substantial power in the federal courts. Only 
certification, however, vests any real power in the state courts. Under certification, one of 
the parties may request that the federal court initiate certification proceedings, or the 
federal court may do so sua sponte;149 either way, the federal court has ultimate discretion 
whether to use certification.150 However, it is also true that the state court then has 
discretion as to whether to accept the request for certification.151 Further, with respect to 
decomposition of the case into constituent issues, while the federal court initially states 
the questions to be answered, the state court has the freedom to decline to answer some or 
all of the questions, or to redraft the questions as it sees fit.152 It thus seems that 
certification does a good job of relying upon, and encouraging, comity between the 
federal court system and the state judiciaries.  
As compared to certification, Supreme Court review of state court rulings by writ 
of certiorari relies far more heavily upon disparity in power. Under previous procedural 
regimes, the Supreme Court was obligated to review at least some state court 
decisions.153 By contrast, under the current system of direct Supreme Court review of 
state court decisions on matters of federal law, it is the system whose questions of law are 
at issue that enjoys full discretion.154 It is the parties who petition for its use, and the 
Supreme Court that decides whether to invoke it; the state court has no voice in the use of 
the device. Thus, direct Supreme Court review empowers one system to correct another 
system, while certification empowers one system to ask another system to help it resolve 
questions of law (and the other system remains free to decline that request for help).  
Power over case decomposition is also less well balanced under certiorari review 
than under certification. While the federal court decides (perhaps with the input of the 
parties) what issues it would like the state high court to determine under both devices,155 
under direct Supreme Court review, it is the Court itself that ultimately decides the scope 
                                                                                                                                                                             
149 See supra text accompanying note 19.  
150 See Nash, supra note 16, at 1692.  
151 See supra text accompanying note 21. 
152 See supra text accompanying note 23.  
153 See supra note 11.  
154 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.  
155 See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 20. 
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of the review that it will undertake.156 The Court in theory must restrict its review to 
matters of federal law, but that in practice may prove difficult. This may further 
complicate relations with the state court whose decision is under Supreme Court review, 
since, as in Johnson, the state court may resent what it perceives to be an impingement on 
its authority to decide matters of state law. Further, the Court’s presumption under 
Michigan v. Long157 can be seen to have two deleterious effects on federal-state court 
relations. First, the presumption results in more state high court decisions being reviewed. 
Second, the presumption makes it likely that at least some of the time the Court will 
erroneously treat state court decisions as relying on federal law when in fact they rest 
upon independent and adequate state law grounds.158 Indeed, the ambivalent relationship 
between the state and federal judiciaries is evident in the examples I discussed above; the 
Johnson and Fitzgerald cases highlight the potential for conflict between the Supreme 
Court and state courts whose decisions are reviewed.159  
Certification also compares favorably to abstention on this metric. Unlike 
certification where the state court is free to decline involvement, a state court is expected 
to act once a federal court has abstained. Moreover, under England reservation doctrine, 
the federal court is free to disregard what the state court thought was the proper 
decomposition of the case into state and federal issues once the case returns to federal 
court.160  
In the end, then, two devices—abstention and review by the Supreme Court of 
state law judgments by writ of certiorari—seem more inclined to emphasize the friction 
between the systems. By contrast, certification of questions of state law is better designed 
to foster, and benefit from, cooperation between the systems.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
156 See supra text accompanying note 9-10. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 94-95.  
158 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
159 See supra text accompanying notes 97-113.  
Cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 381-82 (1816) (opinion of Johnson, J.) 
(suggesting that perhaps the better practice, and one that better preserves the dignity and independence of 
the state courts, is simply for the Supreme Court to enter judgment rather than to remand a case to the state 
court with instructions that the state court must follow). 
160 See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1117, 1126 (noting that “friction between the state and federal 
systems . . . may be exacerbated . . . under Pullman abstention); see also id. at 1134 (“If . . . avoidance of 
friction between federal and state systems is the paramount justification for abstention, one might well 
conclude that only Burford-type abstention would be wholly justified.”). 
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V. REASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF TRANSJURISDICTIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
 
In this Part, I describe, and apply, a fuller benefit-cost analysis for 
transjurisdictional adjudication. First, I identify costs, based upon the obstacles I 
identified in the previous Part, that commentators have either overlooked or 
underestimated. Second, I discuss one benefit of transjurisdictional adjudication—
affording a court system the opportunity to resolve definitive matters arising under that 
system’s native law—that commentators have tended to overvalue or overemphasize. 
Third, I identify the opportunity costs of transjurisdictional adjudication—that is, the 
benefits of intersystemic adjudication that are foregone by virtue of reliance on 
transjurisdictional adjudication. Finally, I use the fuller consideration of benefits and 
costs that results to suggest refinements to current certification procedure, and also to 
design a new transjurisdictional procedural device.  
 
A. Identifying Overlooked and Underestimated Costs and Benefits 
 
The obstacles that I identified in the previous Part give rise to costs commentators 
often have undervalued or overlooked. First, decomposing cases into constituent issues 
generates costs. There are costs to the courts involved—possibly exacerbating, and 
exacerbated by, power disparities between the relevant court systems—in terms of 
deciding who determines the proper decomposition and what the proper decomposition 
is. There also may be costs, both monetary and temporal, to litigants with respect to the 
decomposition process. For example, in the Fitzgerald case, certiorari review and remand 
added almost two years to the time necessary to resolve the case definitively,161 with no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
161 The Iowa Supreme Court handed down its original decision on August 6, 2002. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on January 17, 2003, and handed down its opinion on June 9 of that year. The Iowa 
Supreme Court issued its opinion on remand on February 3, 2004, and the Supreme Court denied a second 
petition for certiorari on June 7, 2004. Certainty may be not only elusive, but also time-consuming.  
Perhaps concerns of comity underlay the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the case a second time in the 
wake of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision on remand. The petitioner sought review based upon the 
question: 
Did the Iowa Supreme Court violate the United States Supreme Court mandate for “further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion” when on remand that Court declined to formulate 
a different standard for examining claims under the state Equal Protection Clause, and accepted 
federal equal protection principles, but reapplied the federal principles to reject as erroneous 
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change in the final outcome. Finally, the presumption of Michigan v. Long may mean that 
the Court may decide a case only to have the state court on remand disagree with the 
presumption that the case originally was not decided on independent and adequate state 
law grounds, and stand by its original decision. This will generate both legitimacy and 
error costs.  
Second, consider bias, and the perception of bias, and the costs it exacts on 
invocations of transjurisdictional procedural devices.  To the extent that use of an existing 
or a new transjurisdictional procedural device sends state law issues that otherwise would 
be decided in federal court back to state court, state courts regain their ability (or at least 
their perceived ability) to discriminate against out-of-state litigants. If state courts in fact 
engage in bias, this will generate error costs and legitimacy costs. Even if a state court 
does not in fact decide cases in a biased way but is nonetheless perceived to do so, then 
the use of such devices will still give rise to legitimacy costs even if they do not give rise 
to error costs.  
Consider now the extent to which costs will be imposed by devices that rely upon 
disparity in judicial system power, rather than comity, to achieve effectiveness. First, the 
absence of cooperation and emphasis on power disparity may make one court system—
likely the state court system—less likely to participate fully and voluntarily, which serves 
only to undermine the success of the device itself. Second, to the extent that the 
participation of one court system is less than willing, litigants may face increased costs 
even if the use of the procedural device is ultimately “successful.” Third, tensions and 
disagreements between court systems may bleed over to other interactions between court 
systems. Thus, while the fact that courts from the different systems may deal with one 
another repeatedly may on the one hand serve to rein in uncooperative actions,162 it is 
also possible that the tensions that one transjurisdictional device generates may interfere 
                                                                                                                                                                             
those specific rational bases expressly found by the United States Supreme Court to sustain a 
state tax statute? 
Brief of Petitioner i (filed Apr. 6, 2004) (available at 2004 WL 831355). The Court may have thought it 
better not to raise the specter (by accepting review) that the Iowa court had shifted its position in order to 
preserve its original holding. This may reflect some degree of comity; indeed, as I have discussed above, it 
is not surprising to see federal court willingness to accommodate the state court (as opposed to the reverse) 
given the structure of certiorari review, see supra text accompanying notes 152-159.  
162 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE 
LAW 159-87 (1994) (discussing the relevance in game theory of repeated play).  
 Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication 38 
with the use of other transjurisdictional devices and with other interactions between 
courts, and conceivably even between other branches of government.  Fourth, there is a 
possible cost in terms of the public conception of the judiciary: It is conceivable that the 
public might lose confidence in judicial systems, both as a result of uncooperative 
interactions that the public observes between judicial systems, and also as a result of 
displeasure over one judicial system—likely the federal system—exerting power over 
another court system in an unseemly way.  
Even while it is true that transjurisdictional adjudication may create friction 
between judicial systems (as well as error costs), it is also true that the absence of 
transjurisdictional adjudication—that is, intersystemic adjudication—may itself foment 
friction. Whether the frictions alleviated by transjurisdictional adjudication exceed those 
introduced by it is an empirical question. My point is simply that it is a mistake to point 
to transjurisdictional adjudication simply as a means of reducing friction, without 
acknowledging that it may introduce frictions of its own.  
 
B. An Overvalued and Overemphasized Benefit of Transjurisdictional Adjudication 
 
Commentators often tend to extol the virtue of affording court systems the 
opportunity to resolve questions arising under the system’s native law. While this is 
clearly a benefit offered by the use of transjurisdictional adjudication, commentators have 
sometimes tended to elevate this benefit to the exclusion of other benefits. In reality, our 
federal system also reflects other values, as I now discuss. Other benefits often motivate 
the generation and use of transjurisdictional procedural devices, sometimes even 
substantially. That, in turn, draws in question the degree to which commentators have 
emphasized the benefits of enabling a court system to resolve questions of native law.  
To begin, it is important to note that it is possible to ameliorate, or even to 
eliminate, some of these problems I discussed in Part IV—and the accompanying costs I 
discussed in Part V.A—by having a unitary judicial system with a single final arbiter of 
all legal questions.163 But there are benefits that come from having distinct judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
163 Professor Robert Schapiro explains: 
In Australia and Canada, . . . a federal high court serves as the ultimate interpreter of both 
national and subnational law. Commentators credit the existence of a single final interpreter with 
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systems. The maintenance of separate state and federal court systems satisfies both 
social164 and political165 concerns.  
The Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Statute and the full faith and credit 
statute further evidence the Founders’ and Congress’s rejection of a unitary model. And 
the Supreme Court’s agreement is evident from its decision in San Remo, which confirms 
the limited availability of exceptions to the full faith and credit statute.166  
That said, the existing system has generated transjurisdictional procedural devices 
that often have the effect of enabling a court system to resolve questions that arise under 
the system’s own set of laws. But the fact that a device may often have this effect does 
not mean that it was designed primarily to achieve that result. Consider for example that, 
while Pullman abstention does give state courts the opportunity to resolve contested 
matters of state law,167 its genesis is a desire to allow federal courts to avoid unnecessary 
decision of difficult constitutional questions168; indeed, Pullman abstention is not 
permitted solely to allow state court resolution of matters of state law.169 In endorsing 
Pullman abstention in cases where definitive state court resolution of a state law issue 
may obviate the need for a federal court to address a novel or contest federal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
creating a greater sense of the unity of the law. Statutory law differs among the states and 
territories, but the federal high court serves as a unifying force. The absence of parallel court 
systems decreases the possibility of interpretive divergence between state and federal tribunals, 
and the single high court structure diminishes the variations in the law among the various states. 
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1409-10 (footnotes omitted).  
164 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and 
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1771-73 (1992) 
(“One of the greatest values of our federal system is the benefit to be gained from an open interchange of 
ideas among sovereigns. . . .”); cf. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 
YALE J. INT’L L. 409 (2003) (discussing different models for, and the possible benefits of, transnational 
judicial dialogue). See generally infra note 177 and accompanying text.  
165 See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 891, 901-02 (1990) (discussing the Madison-Wilson political compromise, under which the 
Constitution authorized, but did not mandate, the creation of lower federal courts).  
166 See Sterk, supra note 88, at 278 (describing language used by the Court in England that “focused on 
a plaintiff’s right to litigate federal claims in a federal forum” as “quaint in light of the Court’s subsequent 
jurisprudence”).  
167 See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1114.  
168 See id. at 1112-13.  
169 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (federal court cannot abstain solely on the ground 
that state law issue is novel or confusing). I have argued elsewhere that it is inconsistent with the federal 
diversity jurisdictional grant to use certification in cases in so-called “pure diversity cases” in which no 
issue of federal law lurks, i.e., in cases in which Pullman abstention remains unavailable under Meredith. 
See Nash, supra note 16, at 1738. I have also argued that proposals to expand the use of certification, as 
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constitutional issue but not in cases where no issue of federal law lurks, the Supreme 
Court implicitly valued the benefit of avoiding “unnecessary” resolution of constitutional 
issues over the benefit of having, at all costs, state courts resolve state law issues that 
otherwise would be resolved in federal court.170  
While commentators who evaluate transjurisdictional adjudication have tended to 
focus on the benefit of empowering court systems to resolve native questions of law, the 
reality is that neither the existing multiple judicial system model, nor the existence of 
many transjurisdictional devices, vindicates valuing of this empowerment as an 
unmitigated benefit. In this sense, then, many commentators have overstated or 
overemphasized this benefit.171  
Of course, the choice to have, nor not to have, a unitary court system is a 
normative one, and one can make a normative argument in favor of a unitary system even 
if one does not now exist. That said, it seems to me inconsistent to accept on the one hand 
the existing multiple judicial system model, while on the other hand to extol devices that 
would have the effect of moving the existing system closer to a unitary model, without 
acknowledging other goals that might underlie the design and use of those devices.  
 
C. Overlooked and Underestimated Benefits of Intersystemic Adjudication 
 
I turn now to some opportunity costs of transjurisdictional adjudication—benefits, 
that is, of not using transjurisdictional procedural devices. In the absence of such 
procedural devices, intersystemic adjudication will be the rule; state law questions will be 
resolved in federal court and federal law questions in state court.172 This means that 
multiple courts may opine on the same legal issue. This may generate several benefits. 
Consider first the value of having more than one court speak to a particular legal issue. 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem suggests that increasing the number of decisionmakers will 
                                                                                                                                                                             
well as Judge Newman’s proposal to have appeals of state law issues from federal trial courts proceed in 
state appellate courts, are similarly problematic. See id. at 1739-40. 
170 Cf. Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1414-16 (noting the difficulty in harmonizing three principles: 
“(1) courts should avoid federal constitutional rulings when possible . . . ; (2) state courts should be the 
primary interpreters of state law . . . ; and (3) no barriers should impair the availability of a federal forum 
for federal claims” (footnote omitted)).  
171 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 28, at 1279 (emphasizing “the enormous benefits” of 
transjurisdictional adjudication).  
172 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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increase the likelihood of reaching the “correct” outcome: Assuming that each 
decisionmaker has a better than even chance of choosing the correct outcome, the Jury 
Theorem predicts that the choice of the majority of decisionmakers will likely be the 
correct outcome, and also that this likelihood increases as the number of decisionmakers 
increases.173 Here, one would treat each court as a separate decisionmaker.174 In this 
sense, allowing multiple courts from multiple systems to speak on legal issues should 
increase our ability to identify correct resolutions of those issues.175  
Even if one rejects or questions the formal applicability of the Jury Theorem to 
the context of appellate court consideration of legal questions,176 benefits remain from 
having multiple courts address the same issue. First, consider the benefits that flow from 
increased dialogue between state and federal courts. A multiplicity of opinions, and 
potentially also of approaches, might help to open debate as to the proper way to resolve 
an issue.177 It also would reduce the problematic situation of an initial court decision that 
turns out to be ill-advised yet binding on all other courts.178 
                                                                                                                                                                             
173 The Condorcet Jury Theorem provides that, if it is the case that each voter has better than a 50% 
chance of voting for the correct outcome, then “the probability that a majority vote will select the correct 
alternative approaches 1 as the number of voters gets large.” Paul H. Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328 (2002). In the context of appellate court review, 
the theorem suggests that, the greater the number of judges that sit on an appellate panel, the greater the 
likelihood that the panel will reach the correct result. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1632-33 (2000).  
174 One could also treat that each judge as a distinct decisionmaker. In that case, increasing the number 
of courts will also increase the number of relevant decisionmakers, especially if (as tends to be the case for 
appellate courts across judicial systems) the courts consist of more than one judge. Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 711-12 (2007) (arguing that, in the 
context of Supreme Court review of administrative action, “the votes of agency decision-makers are also 
useful inputs for Jury Theorem purposes”).  
175 See Eric A. Posner & Cass. R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006) 
(arguing that the Condorcet Jury Theorem offers limited support for the practice of considering the law of 
other nations in determining domestic law); id. at 142 (using an example where a state court might consider 
how the majority of other state courts to have considered a question have ruled).  
176 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply 
to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 125, 144-46 (2002) (arguing that the theorem is of 
limited applicability to the appellate court setting because appellate panels bear little resemblance to juries).  
177 See David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
317, 324-27 (1977) (discussing “the ‘migration of ideas’ between the state and federal systems” in light of 
federal diversity jurisdiction) (quoting Diversity Jurisdiction, Hearings on S. 1876 before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d CONG., 1st Sess. 162, 256 
(1971) (testimony of John Frank)). As Professor Schapiro explains in the context of interpreting state 
constitutional provisions: “The federal court interpretation may be helpful . . . in contributing to the 
discussion of the best way to realize the underlying constitutional value. Federal judges can contribute to a 
plurality of legal meaning, which provides a rich background for the investigation of fundamental rights.” 
Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1417; see id. at 1417-20.  
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Next, just as having multijudge panels fosters collegiality among judges,179 so too 
may having courts from different systems opine on the same legal issues foster 
collegiality among the various judges, courts, and judicial systems. Such collegiality 
should encourage judges to consider themselves in a community of judges that reaches 
beyond judicial system boundaries.180  Somewhat ironically, it also should help to 
facilitate the use of transjurisdictional procedural devices in the instances in which they 
are used.181 
Finally, to the extent that some have argued that federal courts are of greater 
quality than their state counterparts,182 intersystemic adjudication offers a benefit to state 
court systems. First, state courts may become of better quality by virtue of resolving 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Even if federal issues were largely decided by federal courts and state issues by state courts, there still 
could be valuable dialogue between the federal and state courts. For example, insofar as many state 
constitutional provisions mirror their federal counterparts, federal and state courts could debate and discuss, 
through judicial opinions, the proper interpretation of similarly worded language. Missing from that 
dialogue, however, would be debate and discussion as to the proper interpretation of exactly the same 
provisions—that is, the dialogue would be by analogy only. At some level, then, it seems that, insofar as 
the choice not to empower a single court to be ultimate arbiter of all legal questions reflects a desire for 
dialogue among court systems, it is not unreasonable to see the choice as reflecting a desire to attain 
maximum dialogue by allowing courts of different systems to rule on exactly the same issues.  
The possible benefits of dialogue are exemplified by the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision to 
adopt the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of Illinois conflict of laws rules as endorsing the old presumptive 
rule that the law to be applied in a tort action is the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. See 
Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 903-04 (Ill. 2007) (citing Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton 
Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1999)).  
Of course, sometimes opportunities for dialogue fall flat. Consider Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 
652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982), where the Second Circuit was faced with a 
novel issue of Tennessee law. Rather than certifying the question to the Tennessee Supreme Court (or even 
to the New York Court of Appeals) or trying its own hand at interpreting Tennessee law, the Second Circuit 
thought it appropriate to defer to an opinion of the Sixth Circuit (within the geographic reach of which falls 
Tennessee) that was on point. See id. at 283. Not only, then, was the Second Circuit a disinterested 
bystander, it was truly an uninterested bystander. (I am grateful to Henry Monaghan for this point.)  
178 See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1422 (“The existence of parallel, non-intersecting lines of authority 
means that a blockage or error in one will not affect the other.”); cf. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 363 (1999) (“[T]he 
development of appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the appellate level can be understood as a 
strategy to ensure that no single judge can, by her actions alone, inflict too much damage on the judiciary as 
a whole, by making aberrant or overly courageous judgments.”).  
179 See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1639 (2002).  
180 See Adeno Addis & Jonathan Remy Nash, On Judicial Deliberation (work-in-progress).  
181 See supra p. 27 (explaining how the successful use of transjurisdictional devices depends upon good 
relations between the two relevant judicial systems).  
182 See supra note 122.  
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matters of federal law.183 Further, this should result in an elevation in the stature of state 
courts, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of others.184  
To be sure, there are costs that counterbalance each of these benefits.185 The 
greater the numbers of decisions handed down by non-native court systems, the greater 
the likelihood for error costs. There may also be accompanying legitimacy costs. The 
point, however, is not that the benefits necessarily will always outweigh the costs, but 
only that the benefits (and costs) should be evaluated and weighted in each setting before 
a decision is made.  
 
D. Evaluation and Design of Transjurisdictional Procedural Devices  
 
In this Section, I use the fuller identification of the costs and benefits of 
transjurisdictional adjudication in two ways. First, I use costs and benefits as a yardstick 
to evaluate commentators’ proposals for expanded use of transjurisdictional procedural 
devices. Second, I use costs and benefits to suggest refinements of the existing 
certification procedure and design of a new form of certification. 
 
Evaluating commentators’ proposals.—Proposals to expand the use of transjurisdictional 
devices will to some degree increase costs associated with decomposition to the extent 
that they will require decomposition of more cases into constituent federal and state 
issues. Decomposition, moreover, may be likely to increase friction between the court 
systems, thus leading to additional costs. Proposals to expand the use of abstention are 
especially problematic in that they also require decomposing factual issues.  
Consider in this regard Professor Friedman’s proposal to allow litigants to make 
anticipatory England reservations whenever federal claims could be brought in a federal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
183 Cf. Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1126 (noting that, under Burford abstention, “[t]he quality . . . of the 
state judiciary is enhanced, due . . . to the greater responsibility in the resulting adjudication of federal 
matters”). 
184 Cf. id. at 1117 (noting that invocations of abstention other than under Pullman “increase the 
responsibility of state courts in adjudicating federal questions and thus promote greater respect for the state 
judiciary”); see also id. at 1126.  
185 Professor Schapiro identifies the inevitable tradeoffs of three pairs of principles that results from 
increased reliance on intersystemic adjudication—and, concomitantly, decreased reliance on 
transjurisdictional procedural devices: plurality versus uniformity, dialogue versus finality, and redundancy 
versus hierarchical accountability. See Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1417-23.  
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court, even if no federal case then is pending.186 The proposal could give rise to 
substantial decomposition and legitimacy problems, stress the relationship between the 
federal and state judiciaries, and inhibit dialogue between the judiciaries. As initial 
matter, a litigant would be invoking England before a federal court had agreed to abstain 
(let alone had a case pending, or had a formal request to abstain made).187 In order for the 
litigant, or the litigant with the state court’s approval, to bind the federal court to respect 
the reservation, the litigant, or the litigant and state court, would have to have the power 
unilaterally to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute.188 The Court’s 
opinion in San Remo makes clear that a federal court must give full preclusive effect to 
the decision of a state court, even where the federal court has abstained pending the state 
court’s decision.189 San Remo strongly suggests that any attempt to vest such power with 
litigants, or state courts, would be inconsistent with the full faith and credit statute.190 It 
also might raise legitimacy concerns.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
186 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.  
187 Professor Friedman asserts that “[i]t is impossible to see what is achieved by requiring the filing of a 
federal lawsuit when that lawsuit may never prove necessary depending upon how the state court 
proceedings are resolved, particularly when abstention by the federal court is entirely predictable.” 
Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269. One thing that is gained is the ability of the federal court to exercise its 
discretion to abstain or not. Professor Friedman’s point is more convincing to the extent that, as he puts it, 
“abstention by the federal court is entirely predictable.” Id. Note, however, that the notion that the exercise 
of abstention would become so predictable as to be in effect an exception to the congressional grant of 
jurisdiction may raise questions arise as to the propriety of abstention without discretion. Cf. David L. 
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) (arguing that grants of federal 
jurisdiction implicitly vest the federal courts with principled discretion to decline to exercise that 
jurisdiction). Even if there are such cases, moreover, the universe of cases for which that is true is a small 
one. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269 n.184.  
188 The proposed expansion of England would require a parallel expansion of the implicit exception that 
England imposes on the full faith and credit statute. The Supreme Court in San Remo makes suggests that, 
but for a valid England reservation, the rules of res judicata require that preclusive effect be given to state 
court judgments. Professor Stewart Sterk has argued that the Supreme Court’s San Remo decision interprets 
the full faith and credit statute to require federal courts to accord claim preclusive and issue preclusive 
effect to state court judgments. If that is true, then, at least under current law, a subsequent federal lawsuit 
would be barred to the extent that the plaintiff was seen to be splitting her claims between the state and 
federal lawsuits, or to be relitigating identical issues. Professor Friedman argued to the contrary (albeit 
before San Remo) that, “[i]f the Supreme Court can limit the impact of preclusion in the England situation 
itself, there is no reason why it cannot do so when an England reservation is made in these other 
circumstances and federal litigation (if still necessary) follows immediately on the heels of state litigation.” 
Friedman, supra note 28, at 1270-71. While Professor Friedman may be correct as a normative matter, it 
seems fair to say as a descriptive matter that the Court’s opinion in San Remo may indicate that the Court, 
at least as currently composed, is unlikely to take that step.  
189 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.  
190 See supra note 92.  
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If (as seems likely) the power to validate an invocation of England must remain 
with the federal court, then the state court would be faced with a quandary. If it is 
reasonably confident that the federal court will grant abstention191 and recognize the 
England reservation once a federal lawsuit is subsequently filed, then the state court 
might try to restrict itself to resolving only state law matters and the facts attendant 
thereto. If it is wrong and the federal court denies abstention, then the decomposition will 
have been for naught and the state court presumably would have to continue to resolve 
the remaining federal issues and factual matters. Even if it is right and the federal court 
winds up abstaining, there is some chance that preclusion will render the reservation, and 
therefore the decomposition, moot,192 and also some chance that the federal court will 
disagree with the state court’s decomposition and retry certain legal and/or factual 
matters.  All this uncertainty might generate legitimacy concerns and also friction 
between judicial systems.193  
Consider next various proposals to employ certification more frequently. I have 
noted above that, of all the existing transjurisdictional procedural devices, certification 
seems to work best in terms of generating relatively little friction between the state and 
federal court systems. That said, there is a risk that increased reliance upon certification 
will at some point inordinately tax state court systems. At some point, excessive reliance 
upon transjurisdictional procedural devices by one court system at the expense of the 
other might engender resentment and discourage voluntary cooperation. Either the state 
courts will to their own frustration endeavor to continue to satisfy federal court 
certification requests, or the state courts may begin to deny certification requests more 
frequently which may frustrate the federal courts. There is some evidence that this may 
be happening even under the current system.194 Moreover, recent statutory enactments—
                                                                                                                                                                             
191 Professor Friedman observes that there are cases in which “abstention by the federal court is entirely 
predictable.” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1269. Even if there are cases in which abstention is indeed 
“entirely” predictable, the set of such cases is not large. See supra note 187.  
192 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (explaining San Remo’s holding that preclusion 
applies even where a valid England reservation is made).  
193 The proposal also would decrease dialogue between the state and federal judiciaries to the extent that 
state court would less frequently decide matters of federal law.  
194 Indeed, there is some evidence that even now the volume of certification requests is considerably 
beyond what state courts can, or at least choose to, handle. While Professor Friedman (who appears not to 
endorse Professor Clark’s presumption in favor of certification, see supra note 75) asserts that “most 
diversity cases do not require certification” since “their disposition rests on state law that is sufficiently 
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such as the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005195—and court cases—such as the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grable & Sons196—will lead to more state law claims being heard in 
federal court, and hence an enlargement of the universe of cases in which certification 
might be used, and therefore presumably an increase in actual certification requests, even 
under the current standard for invocation of certification. Lowering the threshold would 
generate even more frequent use of the device. Thus, for example, Professor Clark’s 
suggested presumption in favor of certification197 either raises concerns about the state 
courts’ willingness, and capacity, to respond to much larger number of such requests, or 
raises concerns about the federal courts’ ability somehow to compel state courts to 
respond to certification requests, even in the face of unwillingness or perhaps even 
limited capacity to accommodate a much larger number of such requests.198  
Increased use of certification would also reduce dialogue between the state and 
federal judiciaries insofar as the federal courts would be less likely to opine on matters of 
state law. Moreover, increased reliance on certification would combine with the increase 
in opportunity, resulting from the Court’s decision in Grable, to employ certification in 
cases in which federal and state law intertwine, to present more problems of case 
decomposition.  Finally, increased reliance on certification would increase the possibility 
of bias, and of the perception of bias.  
Judge Newman’s suggestion to funnel appeals of federal issues to federal courts 
of appeals and state issues to state appellate courts199 is more sensitive to the problem of 
friction between the judicial systems: Judge Newman’s suggestion would, roughly at 
least, offset the increase in state court appellate workload by taking away from state court 
appellate dockets appeals involving federal issues. His approach, in other words, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
settled,” Friedman, supra note 28, at 1276, a limited empirical study presented by Judge Alex Kozinski in a 
dissenting opinion suggests that the California Supreme Court “has rejected one-third of the cases [that the 
Ninth Circuit has] certified to it since the [state certification] rule went into effect.” Kremen v. Cohen, 325 
F.3d 1035, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see id. at 1054 app. (displaying a table 
summarizing dispositions of Ninth Circuit certification requests to the California Supreme Court). 
195 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
196 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.  
197 See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.  
198 Here I mean to refer to the capacity of the federal courts to force state courts to respond to certified 
questions either by truly compelling them (a power which is in doubt), see Nash, supra note 16, at 1690-91 
n.74, or by strong suggestion or other methods of attempted coercion grounded in power disparity.  
199 See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.  
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endeavors to balance workload and responsibility between judicial systems, which seems 
likely to foster cooperation and comity. The proposal does less well with respect to 
preserving dialogue between the state and federal judiciaries, and avoiding the difficulties 
of case decomposition. While Judge Newman’s suggestion would preserve some 
dialogue—between federal trial courts and state appellate courts, and between state trial 
courts and federal appellate courts—it would eliminate federal appellate courts from 
dialogue over state law and state appellate courts and supreme courts from dialogue over 
federal law.200 Judge Newman’s proposal would also require the decomposition of large 
numbers of cases, and as a result generate sizable costs.  
Judge Calabresi’s suggestion for a modified certification procedure is also sensitive to 
the role of state courts: Even though Judge Calabresi’s proposal would lead to increased 
use of certification, because he calls as a prerequisite for federal courts to draft an opinion 
tackling the state law questions to be certified, the state high courts may feel freer to 
reject certification requests unless the federal court opinion in fact gets the answers 
wrong. In this sense, Judge Calabresi’s proposal positions federal courts as subordinate to 
the state high court.201 By requiring federal courts to offer a suggested interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
200 It might be argued that vibrant and effective dialogue between judicial systems does not require the 
participation of every court at every level. Even now, for example, the Supreme Court does not hear 
appeals of state law resolutions by state courts unless the determination is antecedent to a question or 
federal law, or is suspected of having been devised so as to evade or cheat federal law or federal judicial 
review. See supra text accompanying notes 114-115. It also will almost always decline to review federal 
court determinations of state law as a matter of efficient allocation of judicial resources. See Leavitt v. Jane 
L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (Supreme Court granted certiorari “solely to review what purports to be an 
application of state law” because “the alternative is allowing blatant federal-court nullification of state 
law”); see generally Nash, supra note 139, at 990-91. Thus, the Supreme Court generally does not 
participate in dialogue on matters of state law.  
That said, while the presence of one additional participant in a dialogue may be of negligible benefit, cf. 
Saul Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic 
Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589, 597 n.30 (2003) (noting the “declining 
marginal gains in accuracy from increased numbers of voters under the Condorcet Jury Theorem”), the 
benefit of the inclusion of entire tiers of courts would seem to be potentially great. More importantly, 
experience indicates that state courts often adopt reasoning advanced by federal appellate courts and vice 
versa. See, e.g., supra note 177.  
201 Judge Calabresi explains:  
[T]he intermediate federal courts should be no more than the ‘Appellate Division for Diversity 
Cases.’ We should think of ourselves as an intermediate state court whose function it is to decide 
provisionally, and let the highest court of the state ultimately determine state law.. . . What 
federal judges should do, if state law is uncertain, is write an opinion which says what we think 
that law ought to be. We should write an opinion of the same sort that the state’s appellate 
division would write. And then we should certify, so that the New York Court of Appeals is able 
to decide (1) not to take the case, if it thinks that we are right, or if it is not ready to take the issue 
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state law that the state court could consider in deciding whether to grant the certification 
request, the proposal would also tend to preserve dialogue between the state and federal 
judiciaries as compared to proposals to expand the use of certification in its current form. 
Just as the Supreme Court’s discretion to grant certiorari review is often used with an eye 
to fostering dialogue among lower state and federal courts on federal law issues,202 so too 
would Judge Calabresi’s modified certification procedure tend to foster such a dialogue 
with respect to state law issues.  
 
Refinement and design.—The full consideration of costs and benefits can also be an aid 
in refining existing transjurisdictional procedural devices. For example, despite 
certification’s good ability to harness the federal and state courts’ cooperative spirit, 
some changes to that device might be considered. First, as I have noted above, while 
Pullman abstention does give state courts the opportunity to resolve contested matters of 
state law,203 its genesis is a desire to allow federal courts to avoid unnecessary decision of 
difficult constitutional questions204; indeed, Pullman abstention is not permitted solely to 
allow state court resolution of matters of state law.205 Theoretically, the use of 
certification, as a streamlined form of abstention, should to some degree incorporate this 
point. Even if the lower costs of certification give that procedure a lower invocation 
threshold, and even if that lower threshold allows its use even where there is no federal 
issue in a case, one would think that the presence of a complex federal question whose 
                                                                                                                                                                             
up, or if it just doesn't want to bother to take it at that time; or (2) to take it, if it likes, in exactly 
the same way it does cases brought up (on certiorari, essentially) from the appellate division. 
If federal judges did that, if we had that structural view of our role, then we would not be 
insulted when the New York Court of Appeals declines certification. Now, when the New York 
Court of Appeals declines certification, some federal judges walk around saying, “What did they 
do to us? After all, we are the Second Circuit, they should listen to us!” My view is exactly the 
opposite. We have indicated how we would decide something, or simply explicated our doubts on 
the issue. If the state’s highest court doesn’t want to take it, great! That gives us authority to 
impose our view of state law, provisionally, until the highest court of the state decides to resolve 
the question. 
Calabresi, supra note 41, at 1301-02. (One might query, as Professor Bradford Clark has to me, whether 
such federal court opinions run the risk of being seen as merely advisory.)  
202 See Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court’s 
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984) (extolling the virtue of having the 
Supreme Court decline to address a legal issue while it “percolate[s]” in the lower courts).  
203 See Bezanson, supra note 82, at 1114.  
204 See id. at 1112-13.  
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decision might be avoided by resolution of a matter of state law would weigh in favor of 
the use of certification, while certification would be less likely absent such an issue.206  
A second suggested refinement to current certification procedure arises from the 
possibility that the use of certification may empower state courts to render biased 
decisions, or at least that its use may give rise to such a perception. One answer to this 
problem would be to make explicit that the federal court need not follow the state court’s 
responses to certified questions in every case. Specifically, the federal court could make 
clear that it need not follow a state court’s response when there is adequate evidence that 
the court has responded in a biased way.  
One might argue that Erie requires the federal court simply to apply the state 
court’s ruling, but it must be that bias is an exception. The very premise of diversity 
jurisdiction suggests that federal courts should not decide cases exactly as the state court 
would if doing so would entail being biased against or in favor of parties on a 
geographical basis.207  
In the end, it is unlikely that many state courts will be sufficiently explicit as to 
reliance upon bias.208 Thus, it would also make sense to have federal courts announce 
they will be disinclined against certifying questions to state courts where there is 
evidence that prior responses to certified questions may have been motivated by bias. In 
making such determinations, federal courts could look to see how frequently, and how 
and why, state courts have seen fit to overrule or limit earlier responses to certified 
questions that purported to be general statements of law. Such an approach would offer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
205 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) (federal court cannot abstain solely on the ground 
that state law issue is novel or confusing).  
206 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.  
207 The Court’s ability to review purportedly state law decisions where the state law decision is couched 
in a way so as to insulate it against federal review, see supra text accompanying notes 114-115, also 
supports the validity of this notion. 
An extension of Professor Schapiro’s argument that “courts may make mistakes in their interpretation of 
the law,” Schapiro, supra note 1, at 1413, provides further theoretical underpinning. One can argue that a 
state court of last resort may err in interpreting state law: Specifically, a ruling in which bias affects a state 
court’s resolution of a legal issue is a case in which the court errs in interpreting the law, and, analogously, 
a case in which bias is perceived to have affected the resolution (even if in fact it did not) is a case in which 
it is perceived that the state court erred in interpreting the law. Perhaps federal courts should have some 
freedom to consider such possibilities.  
208 While Justice Neely was explicit about his goal of favoring in-state plaintiffs against out-of-state 
companies while still on the bench, see supra note 127, one would not expect many court opinions to 
exhibit similar candor.  
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dual benefits: It would decrease the likelihood of certification where bias is, or is 
perceived to be, a real possibility, and it would also create a prospective incentive for 
states not to rely on bias in answering certified questions.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have highlighted the difficulties inherent in having cases traverse 
the divide between judicial systems. While many commentators advocate increased 
reliance on transjurisdictional procedural devices, the commentators overlook or 
undervalue the costs that these devices may introduce. Reliance upon disparities in 
power, bias, and the challenge of decomposing cases into constituent issues are 
potentially problematic for the introduction of new devices as well as expanded use of 
existing ones as, indeed, experience with existing transjurisdictional procedural devices 
confirms. A fuller appreciation of these costs, and of the potential benefits of 
intersystemic adjudication, makes it easier to evaluate proposals to expand the use of 
transjurisdictional procedural devices and, indeed, to design new devices and to refine 
existing ones.  
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